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Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-
tiered Regulation of Unemployment and 
Social Assistance Benefits and Activation 
A summary of eight country case studies 
Frank Vandenbroucke and Chris Luigjes 
with Donna Wood and Kim Lievens1 
No. 137/April 2016 
Introduction 
In this paper, we study eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and 
related benefits (notably social assistance for able-bodied adults) and the concomitant 
activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. We assess their 
experiences and try to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may 
emerge in the context of a (hypothetical) European Unemployment Benefit Scheme (EUBS).2 
In the first section of the paper, we introduce the concept of ‘institutional moral hazard’, and 
contrast it to principal-agent problems which are also observed in the regulation of 
unemployment in some of our case studies. In the second section of the paper, we formulate a 
number of caveats and nuances with regard to our focus on institutional moral hazard. We 
argue that one should distinguish between institutional moral hazard as an objective reality, 
the public perception of institutional moral hazard, and public concern for it. In the third 
section of the paper, we specify factors that contribute to the salience of institutional moral 
hazard. These factors justify the analytical grid that we use to map our eight country cases; it 
is presented in section 4. In section 5, we briefly document the comparative generosity of the 
benefit systems in the countries under review, the overall strictness of the eligibility criteria, 
their budgetary impact, and the role of benefits in macroeconomic stabilisation.  
                                                   
1 Frank Vandenbroucke (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands), Chris Luigjes (University of 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands). 
Donna Wood (University of Victoria, Canada) is co-author for the Canadian case study and country 
fiche. Kim Lievens (KULeuven) is co-author of the Belgian case study and country fiche. 
We thank all the participants in a seminar organised by CEPS and KULeuven on 21 October 2015 to 
discuss our country cases; we also thank Thomas Bredgaard, Bodil Damgaard and Michael Rosholm for 
very useful exchanges on the Danish system, Jan Vanthuyne for exchanges on the Belgian system, Burt 
Barnow and Chris O’Leary for comments on the US system, Regina Konle-Seidl for comments on 
Germany, Cyrielle Champion and Giuliano Bonoli for comments on the Swiss system, Georg Fischer 
for an exchange on the US, and Rodney Haddow and John Myles for an exchange on Canada. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
2 An upshot of this study is that we also developed insights into the complex architecture of 
unemployment regulation in EU Member States, with which an EUBS would interfere. Hence, this study 
also serves as a complement to Task 2B of the overall research project ‘Feasibility and Added Value of 
a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme’. 
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As we explain below, an overall assessment should assess problems of (institutional) moral 
hazard associated with benefit systems on the backdrop of the stabilisation capacity and 
redistributive features of these benefit systems; we can provide comparative data on the 
stabilisation for four of the eight countries under review, but data limitations do not allow us 
to present a comparison of the redistributive features of the systems under review. Section 6 
highlights some of the most relevant features of the multi-tiered regulation of unemployment 
in the countries which we studied. In the final section, we formulate our main general 
conclusions, focusing on unemployment insurance and the lessons one can learn with regard 
to the idea of an EUBS. A summary of all our country case studies is added in the appendix to 
this paper, in the form of ‘country fiches’. (Eight more extensive reports on the country case 
studies are also available; they are added as a separate appendix to the research consortium’s 
report on ‘Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme’.  
We have chosen not to insert bibliographic references in this synthesis, except where it seemed 
necessary. The resources we used for this synthesis and for the country studies are grouped 
together in the bibliography to this synthesis. In the extensive country reports, the reader can 
identify where and how these resources have been used. 
Throughout the paper and the appendices, we use ‘the regulation of unemployment’ as a 
short-cut for the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the activation 
of unemployed individuals.  
We use ‘unemployment insurance’ (UI) to refer to systems that should be classified as social 
insurance rather than as social assistance, because they create entitlements without means-
testing; social assistance (SA) refers to means-tested residual systems. (In most of the countries 
under examination, applying this classification is straightforward, except in Australia and 
Austria, as is explained in the country case studies). When we focus on the benefit side of UI, 
we always explicitly write ‘UI benefits’; when our focus is on the activation of individuals who 
receive UI benefits, we explicitly write ‘UI activation’. The same holds for SA: we refer to ‘SA 
benefits’ to denote social assistance benefits, and we refer to ‘SA activation’ to denote the 
activation of individuals receiving SA benefits. When we write ‘UI’ or ‘SA’ without further 
qualification, we deliberately refer to both the benefit and the activation side of those systems. 
1. The concept of institutional moral hazard 
The introduction of an EUBS would create a multi-tiered system of unemployment benefits, 
with both the EU and Member States playing a role in it. In some countries today the regulation 
of unemployment already holds a multi-tiered character. In this paper we study the 
experiences gained with multi-tiered systems of unemployment regulation in eight such 
countries. In seven of the eight countries under review (the US, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Austria and Belgium) the multi-tiered nature of unemployment 
regulation is linked to a broader context of political decentralisation, but we also highlight 
instances of ‘managerial decentralisation’ and ‘delegation’ in those countries, when relevant 
(we briefly explain these terms in the next paragraphs). In one country in our sample, 
Australia, there is no political decentralisation; in this case, managerial decentralisation is 
implemented through the privatisation of activation, which also creates a multi-tiered system.   
In a general sense, decentralisation is a process of redistributing or dispersing functions and 
powers relevant to the design or implementation of public policies, away from a central 
authority. Political decentralisation implies that different levels of government co-exist, i.e. 
different levels of political authorities, each with their own and separate political 
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constituencies. Managerial decentralisation involves actors who do not have such a political 
nature. In this paper, decentralisation is typically described in terms of a ‘higher’ level on one 
hand (typically the federal or central level), and a ‘lower level’ (regions, provinces, 
municipalities…) on the other hand. However, despite these references to ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
levels, the reader should be aware that some political constitutions (such as the Belgian 
constitution) are not based on a hierarchical relation between the federation (Belgium) and the 
federated entities (the Belgian regions and communities). ‘Decentralisation’ always implies a 
degree of autonomy, which can be measured on the basis of the flexibility that is allowed at 
the lower level with regard to the formal regulation of a policy domain, the selection of policy 
goals, and/or the implementation of the policies.  
We use the word ‘decentralisation’ when there is more than one authority or actor at the lower 
level; if there is only one authority or actor at the lower level, we use ‘delegation’. Hence, in 
our usage of the term, delegation refers to one-to-one relationships between institutions. In 
principle, one could apply the distinction between ‘political’ and ‘managerial’ also to 
delegation, and discern four mutually exclusive concepts: political decentralisation, 
managerial decentralisation, political delegation and managerial delegation. As a matter of 
fact, the examples of delegation in this study always concern managerial delegation. Hence, 
when we write ‘delegation’, we mean ‘managerial delegation’. In this paper, our primary 
interest is in decentralisation, not in delegation: in the context of the broader research project 
to which the paper contributes, institutional moral hazard3 typically becomes politically 
sensitive when (i) policy differences can emerge across a set of governments at the lower level, 
as a consequence of institutional moral hazard, and (ii) the quality of the lower level policies 
affects the budget of the government at the higher level. We include only observations on the 
delegation of powers to a single actor at a lower level when these observations are relevant to 
understand the processes that shape decentralisation or centralisation in the country under 
examination; for instance, Germany and Austria are country cases in which delegation of 
policy powers to the federal public employment service (PES) is a relevant feature and is 
therefore included in the analysis. Hence, the absence of a reference to delegation in a country 
fiche does not imply that delegation does not feature in that country; it may well be the case 
that delegation plays a role in the regulation of unemployment (for instance, in the relationship 
between the government and the PES), but including it in the analysis would not add to our 
understanding of the dynamics of (de)centralisation in that country.        
What can we learn from these national experiences with multi-tiered unemployment 
regulation for the design of an eventual European Unemployment Benefit Scheme? Our 
vantage point is what we call ‘institutional moral hazard’. Economic theory defines moral 
hazard, briefly put, as a situation in which an insured person can affect the insured company’s 
liability without its knowledge (Barr, 2004). We use the expression ‘institutional moral hazard’ 
to describe a situation with the following generic characteristics: 
                                                   
3 Besides moral hazard, there is another important concept that relates to insurance: adverse selection. 
Adverse selection describes a “tendency for insurance to be bought by people who are more likely to 
collect on the policy. This can occur when the purchasers are better informed than the insurer of their 
personal risk” (Barr & Diamond, 2010, p. 207). However, this concept does not apply in the context of 
an EUBS: we are not contemplating a private market for the reinsurance of national unemployment 
insurance systems, in which Member States could pick and choose the policies they prefer; participation 
in a EUBS would be compulsory, i.e. compulsory risk pooling would rule out adverse selection. 
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- Two levels of governments, say level A and level B, are involved in the governance of 
a social risk, with each of them politically accountable vis-à-vis its own political 
constituency (say, a national or regional parliament, or a regional or local council). 
- Level A covers a social risk (notably lack of individual income due to unemployment, 
by means of a replacement income), which could, in principle (as a theoretical 
counterfactual), also be covered by level B instead of level A. 
- Policies deliberately implemented by level B can influence the actual incidence of that 
social risk (at level B), and thus influence the cost to be covered by level A. 
- There is a degree of asymmetric information which makes it impossible for 
policymakers at level A to fully disentangle the impact of pure risk factors, not 
controlled by B, and the impact of B’s deliberate policies on the actual incidence of the 
risk covered by A. 
To make this generic characterisation of institutional moral hazard more tangible, imagine a 
federal country in which UI benefits are paid and financed by the federation, whilst economic, 
labour market and UI activation policies are predominantly organised at the level of the 
federated entities (e.g. states, regions or provinces, with their own political constituency; to 
shorten the exposition in this paragraph, we will only refer to ‘regions’). Unemployment is a 
risk that is not fully ‘controlled’ by the regions; it can be influenced, among other factors, by 
the international business cycle. However, policies developed at the regional level also impact 
regional unemployment and the cost of UI benefits to be covered by the federation. Suppose 
that one can, at least theoretically, conceive an institutional counterfactual, in which the 
regions would finance the cost of UI benefits themselves (or in which they would be 
completely responsible for unemployment regulation in terms of both the design and the 
funding of the benefit system). In the backdrop of that theoretical counterfactual, we may say 
that the regions are, in a sense, ‘insured’ by the federation with regard to the cost of UI benefits. 
The level of unemployment is, to some extent, an uncontrolled risk that befalls them, but their 
‘behaviour’ also has an impact. In yet other words, for the regions, the level of unemployment 
is to some extent an exogenous risk, but to some extent also endogenous, depending on the 
quality of their policy. With reference to the well-known notion of moral hazard in individual 
insurance, this situation creates what we call ‘institutional moral hazard’. In our usage of the 
term, ‘institutional moral hazard’ arises if there is a possibility for the regions to influence the 
cost of UI benefits, borne by the federation. Institutional moral hazard is important, so 
conceived, if one expects the regions to influence the cost of UI benefits significantly; it is less 
important if one does not expect the regions to influence that cost significantly. The importance 
of institutional moral hazard (i.e. our expectation), so conceived, depends on the precise 
architecture of the system. As already indicated earlier, institutional moral hazard typically 
becomes a sensitive political issue when there are (perceived or real) differences in the quality 
of the activation and employment policies implemented by the lower levels of government; 
however, that does not mean that institutional moral hazard does not exist when there are no 
such differences (it may be the case that all regional governments lack incentives to boost 
activation and develop policies that are suboptimal from the federal point of view).  
Some of the countries in our sample present cases which fit neatly into this simple generic 
description with regard to their UI, notably Belgium (regions are responsible for UI activation; 
the federal level is responsible for UI benefits) and Canada (provinces are primarily 
responsible for UI activation as well as SA, the federal level for UI benefits). With regard to UI, 
the Swiss case is also similar, with cantons having a large degree of autonomy with regard to 
UI activation. In most of the other countries, the picture is more complex. In some countries, 
the impact of the lower level of government on the cost of UI benefits, borne by the higher 
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level, originates (or originated, before reforms were implemented) from the lower level’s 
responsibility for SA and the possibility the lower level has (or had) to shift part of the SA 
caseload to UI, at the expense of the higher level. Or, in a more general sense, in some cases in 
our sample there is (or was, before reforms) a discrepancy between SA activation by the lower 
level and UI activation, which was seen as problematic by the higher level of government. 
Austria, Switzerland and Germany exemplify cases in which the interaction between SA and 
UI was an important issue,4 triggering reform.  
In some countries, the federal or central level pays the cost of activation services organised 
and implemented by lower levels of government. To the extent that the higher level of 
government provides an ‘insurance for activation costs’, specific forms of institutional moral 
hazard emerge. Simultaneously, federal or central reimbursement of activation costs (with 
strings attached to it in the form of conditions or ‘minimum requirements’ and/or financial 
incentives built into the reimbursement scheme) may be an instrument to fight institutional 
moral hazard in multi-tiered systems; we observe this in Denmark, whose case presents a 
mixture of all the issues mentioned in this paragraph and the previous one. 
The United States presents a case in which the federal level covers part of the risk of 
unemployment for the states in a more subtle way than in our simple and generic 
characterisation of the problem (i.e. in a more subtle way than in Canada or Belgium). The 
American federal administration allows states to run a temporary deficit in the regular state 
UI system by offering the possibility of a loan, and the federal level co-finances a system of 
extended unemployment benefits in times of crisis and even fully funds a system of emergency 
unemployment benefits in support of the states. The counterpart is a sophisticated financial 
mechanism to ensure state fiscal responsibility for the state-run unemployment systems. 
These examples do not exhaust the complexity of the cases under review; a summary 
description of the essential features of each of the cases is provided in an annex, in the form of 
‘country fiches’.     
In our study of the eight country cases, we distinguish institutional moral hazard from 
institutional principal-agent problems. An institutional principal-agent problem is 
characterised, in the context of our study, by the following situation: 
- The governance of a social risk involves two or more institutional actors, say actor A 
and actors B, C, … Z, with only actor A being a political entity with a political 
constituency vis-à-vis which it is politically accountable; actors B, C, … Z enjoy a 
degree of managerial autonomy but are not political entities. In other words, rather 
than political decentralisation with political agency at all levels, in this case we observe 
a managerial delegation or decentralisation of powers (as indicated earlier, we use 
‘delegation’ when only two actors, A and B, are involved). One should note that the 
decentralised actors B, C, … Z can have a public character, but also a private character 
(e.g. in the case of governance by means of a market tender). 
- Actor A (the principal) expects actors B, C, … Z (the agents) to implement and/or 
develop policies with a view of achieving outcomes desired by A. However, the agents 
are able to act in their own best interests rather than those of the principal. 
                                                   
4 As explained in the country case study, Austria has a system of unemployment assistance which is 
means-tested but displays many features of traditional unemployment insurance. In our analysis of 
Austria, the interaction to which we refer here is the interaction between Austrian social assistance on 
one hand, and unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance on the other hand.  
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- A degree of asymmetric information exists with regard to the degree to which and the 
way in which the agents pursue their own interests rather than the interests of the 
principal. 
- Hence, the principal has to develop a framework which makes the agents pursue, as 
much as possible, the outcomes of the principal desires. Such a framework typically 
encompasses (regulatory) agreements, such as ex ante minimum requirements with 
regard to the policies that are implemented by the agents and financial incentives that 
shape the interests of the agents, but also ex post evaluations based on reporting, 
inspections, etc.5  
In the economic literature, there is some overlap between the treatment of moral hazard and 
the treatment of principal-agent problems, because both are characterised by asymmetric 
information, and both can be remedied by defining minimum (behavioural) requirements and 
by creating specific incentives. In this study, we will not only distinguish between the two 
concepts but use them in a mutually exclusive sense: situations we describe as instances of 
‘institutional moral hazard’ will not be coined in terms of a ‘principal-agent’ problem, and vice 
versa. The essential distinction is related to the prevalence of political agency at all levels in 
the case of institutional moral hazard: the idea that one political entity covers a risk for which 
the other entity might be held politically responsible in a theoretical counterfactual is key to 
distinguishing institutional moral hazard from the principal- agent problems, which we 
discern in the context of managerial delegation and managerial decentralisation. However, 
notwithstanding this distinction, some of our country cases illustrate the overlap with regard 
to the remedies that are tried: ‘management by objectives’ and ‘performance management’ (or, 
more generally, ‘new public management’) are applied both to tackle principal-agent 
problems in managerial delegation/decentralisation and to reduce institutional moral hazard 
(as we label it) in a context of political decentralisation. 
2. Caveats and nuances with regard to the notion of institutional moral 
hazard 
We should signal two caveats, with regard to the terminology we use and the study’s scope.  
As we will show in some of the country cases, when a government level A is responsible for 
UI benefits whilst a lower government level B (say, a regional or local government) is 
                                                   
5 Some experts with whom we discussed our research disagree with our use of the concept ‘principal-
agent relation’ in the case of an institution such as the German federal PES, the Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
(BA). They argue that the German BA is not an ‘agent’ of the federal government but a self-governing 
institution; one might add to this remark that social partners also have a role as ‘principal’ in the BA, if 
the ‘principal-agent’ framework is used. We recognise the validity of that criticism; it is corroborated by 
a typology developed by Mabbett & Bolderson (1998), who argue that multi-level governance prevails 
in the relationships between central governments and administering institutions in social security, 
rather than simple principal-agent relations. Nevertheless, in the context of this research project, we 
want to maintain a simple distinction between relationships between political actors and relationships 
involving non-political actors (including in the latter, institutions for which social partners are to some 
extent ‘principals’). In follow-up research we will return to this question. Some experts rightly remark 
that we do not systematically look at principal-agent relationships between subnational political 
authorities and implementing institutions; this is true, but, here, we focus on selectively relationships 
which we consider relevant for understanding the main problem at hand.  
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responsible for UI activation, institutional moral hazard may take the form of ‘parking’ hard-
to-activate benefit recipients in ineffective activation programmes. There may also be a 
deliberate policy of cost-shifting by ‘dumping’, e.g. when the regional or local entity, 
responsible for the governance of SA and bearing its budgetary burden, shifts part of the SA 
caseload to UI benefits, for which the federation is responsible.6 Obviously, ‘cost-shifting’ can 
be tried both ways: the federation may engage in cost-shifting at the expense of the regional 
entity when its policies with regard to UI benefits become more stringent and people who lose 
UI benefits are pushed to SA (paid by the regional entity). Whilst the first instance of cost-
shifting (by dumping) naturally fits into the category of ‘institutional moral hazard’, as we 
define it here, the latter example of cost-shifting sits uneasily with the concept of moral hazard: 
moral hazard typically refers to behaviour by the insured and not to behaviour by the insurer. 
Hence, we will not apply the notion of ‘institutional moral hazard’ to changes in policies 
implemented by the level of government that acts as the ‘insurer’; we will then simply label 
this as ‘cost-shifting’ (in the example given here, this may be a reaction by the federation 
resulting from the observation that there is too much room for moral hazard for the regional 
level government). 
A second caveat refers to the scope of our study. Institutional moral hazard emerges when 
decentralised political entities (e.g. regions) are ‘covered’ by some higher-level political entity 
with regard to the cost of unemployment benefits, but can influence the level of 
unemployment by the policies they pursue. Obviously, a whole set of policies impact 
employment and unemployment in a region (to pursue that example): economic policies, 
financial policies, industrial policies, innovation policies, education policies, activation 
policies, systematically shifting SA caseloads to UI or vice versa, and so on. In this study, we 
focus on the latter two aspects of the broad issue of institutional moral hazard, namely i) the 
responsibility for activation and ii) the interactions between different social programmes, such 
as UI and SA for able-bodied adults.  
Activation has a direct impact on the degree to which individual moral hazard occurs in 
unemployment benefit systems and related benefit systems: stringent activation is one way to 
reduce individual moral hazard (this assertion is not self-evident; we return to it below). Thus, 
our study examines a subset of policies in which there is an interplay between the potential 
for individual moral hazard in unemployment and related benefit systems and the potential 
for institutional (or ‘collective’) moral hazard. Understanding that specific interplay between 
the individual and the institutional level is of critical importance, as we will try to show. By 
way of example, imagine an unemployment benefit scheme that does not entail much potential 
for individual moral hazard, because unemployment benefits are not generous and only 
granted for a short time span (which implies that the incentive to search for a new job is 
relatively strong, even when an individual benefits from this UI). In such a case, the quality of 
                                                   
6 Historic examples of such ‘dumping’ practices were to be found in Switzerland, Canada and Austria. 
The federal governments of these countries have tightened UI eligibility and/or taken other measures 
over the years to prevent dumping of SA caseloads. For instance, some Canadian provinces would run 
activation programmes, financed by the federal level, that provided wages and allowed people to 
become eligible again for the Canadian federal UI benefits (called ‘Employment Insurance’ in Canada). 
This practice seems to have stopped, as these activation programmes have become expensive for the 
provinces and employment insurance eligibility is now more restricted. The Swiss and Austrian 
examples are discussed in the country fiches in the appendix. Shifting people from SA to UI via a specific 
activation instrument has also been common practice by local municipalities in Belgium, but it has not 
been objected to as ‘dumping’ or ‘cost-shifting’ at the expense of the Belgian federal level; it has been 
criticised as a poor form of activation since it did not lead to more than six months of employment.  
8 | VANDENBROUCKE & LUIGJES 
 
the policies deployed to activate the unemployed may be a relatively unimportant factor (i.e. 
relatively unimportant with regard to individual moral hazard, and hence relatively 
unimportant with regard to the potential for institutional moral hazard); as a corollary to the 
limited scope for individual moral hazard, given the non-generosity of benefits, there may be 
limited concern for institutional moral hazard. To be more precise: in such a case, the concern 
that might have existed has been ‘pre-empted’ by the low level of generosity of the benefits; 
the ‘residual’ concern is limited. For instance, the limited generosity of American UI benefits 
may explain why (residual) concern for both individual and institutional moral hazard is less 
prominent in the US when it comes to UI. The same observation seems to hold to some extent 
for Canada, where the generosity of UI for longer-term unemployed individuals is 
comparatively limited (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 in section 5, below). Conversely, if a benefit 
system is beset by important problems of individual moral hazard, in a multi-tiered setting 
there will probably be more concern for institutional moral hazard and more pressure on the 
lower level of government to prevent it (again, this assertion is not self-evident, and we return 
to it below). Recent US history provides a telling example of the close link between concern 
for individual moral hazard and concern for what we call institutional moral hazard: in the 
1990s, these interrelated concerns led to the transition from Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  
The scope of our survey is limited in yet another way. Our description of the budgetary aspects 
of country-specific institutional arrangements in unemployment regulation focuses on 
transfers between levels of governments that are directly linked to unemployment regulation. 
Thus, our focus is on budgets for UI benefits, SA benefits, and activation, and the collection of 
revenues that serve to fund these programmes. Obviously, the financial repercussions of 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance with regard to employment and activation go beyond these 
budgets: a Belgian region that is successful in creating employment will not reap the budgetary 
benefits of that success in the unemployment budget (which is situated at the Belgian federal 
level), but it will boost its income tax base (Belgium’s regional budgets are financed, in part, 
by income taxation). In order to understand the financial incentives for Belgian regions to 
perform in activation and employment creation, one should take the whole financial edifice of 
the country into account. Such a comprehensive review of the whole financial edifice of the 
eight countries under review was not possible in the context of this paper. 
Next to these caveats with regard to the scope and focus of our study, we do not wish to 
entertain a simplistic view on the nature and importance of moral hazard. In the traditional 
presentation of the problem, on which we also rely in this study, moral hazard is explained on 
the basis of a simple economic calculus, in which ‘working’ is seen as a burden (generating a 
disutility), while the income from either work or a received unemployment benefit is seen as 
generating a utility. If this calculus does not take into account that people may wish to work 
for reasons of self-esteem, participation in social life, personal development, etc., it not only 
misrepresents human behaviour but also overestimates the problem of moral hazard 
associated with UI and SA. In a similar vein, an interpretation of the behaviour of public 
authorities as if they are only motivated by budgetary reasons and not by the intrinsic good of 
higher employment is too cynical to be true. Public authorities are motivated by the aspiration 
for success in their policies, for which they are accountable vis-à-vis their political 
constituency. In short, a narrow construal of the nature of moral hazard will exaggerate its 
prevalence. 
Apart from this nuance with regard to the prevalence of moral hazard, one should be aware 
that moral hazard is an inevitable corollary of any system of insurance, be it private or public. 
The greater good of collective insurance is that it is able to overcome market failures. On a 
INSTITUTIONAL MORAL HAZARD IN THE MULTI-TIERED REGULATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS | 9 
 
macro level, collective insurance serves social cohesion and economic stabilisation. Economic 
stabilisation contributes to economic growth. In other words, the ‘cost’ of moral hazard should 
be weighed against the benefit of social cohesion, economic stabilisation and – related to this 
– long-term economic growth. The observation that systems of insurance and/or solidarity 
entail moral hazard, is not per se an indictment against such systems. This holds for both 
individual and institutional moral hazard, as we define it. The challenge is to minimise moral 
hazard, given the overriding aim to organise sufficient insurance. Our study should be read 
in this light. Therefore, we also document the role of social benefits in macroeconomic 
stabilisation in the countries under review, to the extent that comparable data are available.  
Finally, we should distinguish moral hazard as an objective reality, i.e. an empirical 
observation with regard to the possibility for the insured to influence the liability of the insurer 
in a context of asymmetric information, from the public perception that moral hazard is present, 
and from public concern for moral hazard: these are three different things. It may be the case 
that there is more concern for moral hazard than reality warrants, and vice versa. In this 
respect, both a gap between perception and reality, and different degrees of public sensitivity 
with regard to the trade-off between moral hazard (as perceived) and the social and economic 
objectives of collective insurance (social cohesion, economic stabilisation) can play a role. We 
study a domain where opinions on matters of social justice, a priori beliefs about human 
behaviour and the choice of economic paradigm are very important. Apart from the fact that 
the trade-off between moral hazard and cohesion and stabilisation constitutes a normative 
problem par excellence, there is less hard empirical science in this domain than one might wish, 
a fortiori when the issue at hand is not only individual behaviour but the interaction of 
collective actors and political authorities.  
3. Factors contributing to the salience of institutional moral hazard 
In the preceding section, we draw a distinction between institutional moral hazard as an 
objective empirical reality, the public perception of institutional moral hazard, and normative 
concern surrounding it. The salience of institutional moral hazard in the multi-tiered 
regulation of unemployment in the eight countries under review should be assessed with these 
different dimensions in mind. 
Since we frame the problem at hand as an insurance problem, a classical textbook analysis of 
moral hazard in insurance is a useful starting point. In his Economics of the Welfare State, Barr 
summarises the problem as follows. At its strongest, the condition that there should be no 
moral hazard requires that both the probability of the risk, p, and the insured loss, L, should 
be exogenous to the individual who is insured. Slightly less stringently, moral hazard can be 
avoided so long as individuals can influence p or L only at a cost to themselves greater than 
the expected gain from so doing. Where that assumption fails, customers of an insurance 
company can affect the insurer’s liability without its knowledge, given the context of 
asymmetric information (Barr, 2004, pp. 111-112). One should note that the cost associated 
with the occurrence of the insured risk can be non-material. The loss of self-esteem and respect 
by fellow citizens, when being unemployed, is an important example in this context; respect 
by fellow citizens and self-esteem may be overriding motives for taking up a job, even if the 
purely financial calculus is an insufficient incentive. Below, we argue that certain aspects of 
activation can also constitute a ‘cost’ (in terms of a disutility) for the unemployed individual.   
In the framework of our earlier generic example of two levels of government, level A and level 
B, with level A offering a collective UI policy to the governments at level B for the cost of 
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unemployment with which governments at level B might be confronted, it seems that eight 
sets of factors contribute to the salience of institutional moral hazard:       
i. The generosity and design of the individual insurance policy offered to the individual 
via unemployment benefits and related benefits. 
ii. The generosity and design of the collective insurance policy offered by government 
level A to government level B, with regard to the cost of unemployment.  
iii. The activation regime linked to unemployment and related benefits. 
iv. The possibility of perverse interactions between benefit schemes for which B is fully 
responsible (notably SA for able-bodied adults) and UI, e.g. the ‘dumping’ of caseloads 
by B onto UI paid by A. 
v. The extent to which there is information asymmetry, i.e. the extent to which pure risk 
factors with which B is confronted can be disentangled from the quality of B’s policies. 
vi. The existence of other mechanisms (next to spending on UI and SA) that make fiscal 
revenues of collective actors sensitive to employment performance in the constituency 
for which they are responsible. 
vii. The heterogeneity of unemployment rates across the political constituencies at level B. 
viii. The importance attached to common goals with regard to social cohesion and economic 
stabilisation, for which insurance is a useful instrument and moral hazard a ‘cost’ of 
the instrument. 
The last factor has to be analysed on the backdrop of the historical developments of multi-
tiered nation states; our country case studies testify to the importance of history.  
We will not elaborate upon all these factors separately, but will add some comments about 
some of them. Factors (i) and (ii) can be understood on the basis of simple economic calculus 
(which, simultaneously, may limit their relevance, as explained in the previous section): a 
more generous UI policy entails a smaller incentive to find work (at the level of the individual, 
in the context of an individual insurance policy) or to reduce the number of unemployment 
benefit recipients (at the level of a lower level of government which is insured against 
unemployment by a higher level of government). However, apart from the generosity of the 
system, the design of the insurance policy plays a role: financial incentive mechanisms can 
organise cost-sharing between the insured and the insurer in different ways. Well-known 
examples of incentive mechanisms in the realm of individual insurance are also applicable to 
relations between institutions. Frequent claimants can be asked to pay higher premiums (the 
US case is an example, both at the level of individual UI, with experience rating, and in the 
relationship between the states and the federal level, with the FUTA system, as we will 
illustrate below). Co-insurance (the insured pays x per cent of any claim) is another example 
of a mechanism that is applicable for the prevention of institutional moral hazard. The 
Extended Unemployment Benefit system in the US applies ‘co-insurance’, so conceived; co-
insurance is a feature of the Danish system with regard to both UI and SA.  
Last but not least, there is a crucial distinction between the use of block grants to compensate 
lower level governments for the cost of social programmes and open-ended funding systems, 
whereby the higher level of government compensates the lower level governments on the basis 
of their caseload. A block grant is a transfer from a federal or central government to a lower 
tier of government to fund programmes, policies and administration with a predetermined 
size. The transfer is done in advance (before any costs are incurred) and periodically (most 
often annually or at longer intervals). Block grants stand in contrast to open-ended funding 
which is contingent on specific indicators reflecting the caseload (such as the number of 
unemployed) and is continuously adjusted. The amount of funding in a block grant can only 
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be adjusted before the transfer and cannot be manipulated midway. Hence, it is hard for lower 
tiers of government to manipulate the amount of funding they receive. Because the size of 
block grants (or the calculating formula) is known in advance, it provokes discussion but it 
leaves little room for institutional moral hazard. Since lower tiers of government know exactly 
how much they will receive in advance, they can adjust their policies accordingly, which can 
also be seen as an advantage. However, it will be harder for lower tiers of government to react 
to unforeseen circumstances. Block grants are less often coupled with detailed and continuous 
monitoring than open-ended funding.  
Insurance normally implies open-ended funding, on the basis of the caseload, yet there may 
be a ‘cap’ on what the insurance company pays. Although it stretches the notion of ‘insurance’ 
rather far, a block grant can be interpreted as an inter-institutional insurance policy with a cap 
that is below the normal level of claims. In some countries, block grants have been introduced 
with the explicit aim to stop the institutional moral hazard that was associated (at least in 
perception, if not in practice) with open-ended funding. The transition, in the US, from Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), for which US states had open-ended funding, to 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which is funded through block grants for 
the states, is a telling example. Canada experienced a similar transition in its SA funding: in 
1996 the open-ended funded Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was replaced by a block grant (the 
Canadian Health and Social Transfer, or CHST). This change in funding system emerges as 
one of the reasons why institutional moral hazard does not seem to be in an issue in today’s 
Canada. In a sense, when it comes to the effectiveness of the use of funds made available via 
these block grants, the main ‘mechanism’ which federal policymakers seem to rely on is the 
democratic political accountability of provincial governments vis-à-vis their own political 
constituencies.7  (As a matter of fact, in the Canadian case, the block-grant nature of the 
funding system is one thing; the amount of money made available via the block grants is also 
increasingly limited compared to the cost of SA incurred by the provinces; it covers less than 
10% of their cost today.) 
As already indicated in section 1, in a multi-tiered setting there is interaction between, on one 
hand, the propensity of an individual insurance policy to generate individual moral hazard 
and, on the other hand, the concern for institutional moral hazard when a higher level of 
government ‘reinsures’ the cost of that insurance policy for the lower levels of government in 
one way or another. As a matter of fact, it would be wrong to assert that a high objective 
potential for moral hazard at the individual level entails, automatically, a high objective 
potential for institutional moral hazard at the level of institutions, and vice versa. A high 
objective potential for individual moral hazard makes it more difficult for the lower level of 
government to prevent it, which is not the same as saying that this lower level of government 
itself would be more prone to (institutional) moral hazard; with regard to the design of the 
benefit system, the two issues should be carefully distinguished. However, if the perception is 
that the potential for individual moral hazard is high and if this perception raises concern, it 
is likely that there would be more pressure on the lower level of government to fight it. In 
other words, the interplay between individual and institutional moral hazard is based on 
perception and concern. This is not to say that this interplay is unimportant or merely a matter 
of discourse: ‘perception’ and ‘concern’ are as much facts of political life and policymaking as 
                                                   
7 Cf. Gauthier (2012, p. 10): “It is the federal government’s position that provinces and territories are 
best placed to determine program priorities and implement programs in response to them. As a result, 
the federal government notes that provinces and territories are directly accountable to their residents 
for their use of federal transfer funding.”  
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the objective architecture of an insurance policy. But an exaggerated perception of moral 
hazard can result in policies that are suboptimal. 
As will be shown in section 5, in some countries means-tested SA plays a much larger role in 
the protection of able-bodied unemployed adults than in other countries; this may explain 
why, for instance, in the Swiss case there is less public concern for institutional moral hazard 
in UI than in Belgium, despite the fact that Swiss cantons have a large degree of autonomy 
with regard to UI activation, whilst UI benefits are federally funded (a situation akin to the 
situation of the Belgian regions). A transition from entitlement-based UI benefits to means-
tested SA benefits may be the result of concern for moral hazard (perceived or real). A shift 
from an insurance system to a means-tested residual system will obviously reduce the overall 
caseload, and, thus, the concern for moral hazard. Moreover, there may be less public concern 
for moral hazard with SA systems, because, across the board, SA clients are perceived as more 
‘needy’ than UI clients by public opinion. However, SA benefits may generate as many 
problems of moral hazard as UI benefits do, for those who receive them, and SA benefits can 
generate specific inactivity traps, precisely because of their means-tested nature.  
We should add a supplementary observation to this, which refers to factor (vii) in our list of 
contributory factors, heterogeneity of employment rates. In a multi-tiered setting whereby risk 
profiles vary greatly across constituent units (as is the case, for instance, with unemployment 
across Belgian regions), the link between concern for individual moral hazard and concern for 
institutional moral hazard will be much stronger. If the unemployment rate is much higher in 
some regions compared to others, a relatively ‘generous and tolerant’ insurance policy at the 
individual level, which is perceived as generating a high degree of moral hazard at the level 
of individuals, will be seen as a recipe for permanent redistribution across the regions, rather 
than as a sound basis for interregional reinsurance; hence, the pressure on the regions to ‘do 
something about it’ will increase. Conversely, a large disparity in the employment record in 
the constituent units of a multi-tiered system, but little concern for institutional moral hazard, 
leaves something to be explained by the political scientist (with regard to UI, Canada offers an 
example). In other words, the interaction between different contributory factors in our list is 
important to understanding the salience of institutional moral hazard.  
Factor (iii) in our list, activation, is key in this study. However, the link between activation and 
institutional moral hazard should be understood correctly, as activation impacts moral hazard 
at the individual level. For instance, if quality training for unemployed people enlarges their 
opportunity set and thus increases their earning potential, the economic incentive to exit 
unemployment is reinforced; the concomitant (positive) reinforcement of economic incentives 
counteracts the impact of moral hazard in the system. In a more direct way, a system of ‘close 
monitoring’ of the search effort of unemployed individuals constitutes an additional ‘cost’ for 
the unemployed individuals, due to the continuous interference in their daily lives and the 
frequently repeated and personalised assessments of their ‘willingness to make an effort’ 
(Vandenbroucke & Vleminckx, 2011). ‘Close monitoring’ increases the incentives to exit 
unemployment, in a negative way, and thus counteracts moral hazard. In short, there is a 
relationship, via different mechanisms, between activation and moral hazard at the individual 
level. We will refer to activation in the context of institutional moral hazard if lower levels of 
government implement activation policies differently, some less stringently, others more so: 
this may be an issue related to the implementation of policies designed at the higher level, or 
an issue of both design and implementation (when activation is the responsibility of the lower 
level). 
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The eighth factor in our list, the importance attached to common goals with regard to social 
cohesion and economic stabilisation, does not influence the incidence of (institutional) moral 
hazard in an objective sense; it influences the public concern that its perception raises. 
Transfers from the American federal level to the states may be more acceptable to American 
citizens, even if their impact is redistributive, than cross-border transfers are in the EU, since 
the feeling of belonging to one American nation is presumably much stronger than the feeling 
of belonging to one ‘European nation’. This may explain (together with other factors, which 
we document in the US case) why public concern for possible institutional moral hazard with 
regard to federal-state transfers is less outspoken in the US than one would expect, from a 
European perspective. Conversely, within many of the EU Member States, the readiness to 
organise solidarity and to redistribute incomes may be much stronger than within many of the 
American states, which explains why unemployment benefits are less generous in American 
states than in EU Member States. So conceived, the US and the EU may exemplify, today, 
different equilibria in their public opinion: Europeans are probably less ready to reinsure their 
relatively generous national unemployment benefit systems at the EU level, compared to 
Americans, who accept a degree of federal reinsurance of relatively ungenerous state 
unemployment benefit systems.    
Obviously, the ‘factors’ in our list include deliberate policies to fight moral hazard at the 
individual and institutional levels. Stringent activation (factor iii) is a case in point, as are 
financial incentives built into the benefit system at the level of individuals, or financial 
mechanisms affecting the budgets of lower level governments as a function of their 
performance (the Danish ‘reimbursement system’ includes such mechanisms, next to specific 
conditions to receive reimbursement, which are more akin to ‘minimum requirements’, 
discussed in the next paragraph). Information asymmetries (factor v) can be tackled with 
detailed systems of performance measurement; this is also a feature of the Danish case.  
In our country case studies, we document an important feature of the institutional architecture 
of unemployment regulation, which we label ‘minimum requirements’. Minimum 
requirements refer to binding policy floors set by higher levels of government for lower levels 
of government. Minimum requirements belong to the ‘regulatory mode of policy-making’ 
(Wallace, Pollack & Young, 2015, p. 103). Minimum requirements can apply to different 
‘factors’ in our list. Minimum requirements play a role in Denmark and Austria (with regard 
to both UI activation and SA activation), in Belgium (with regard to UI activation), and in the 
US (with regard to UI and SA); however, the level of detail and the strictness of these 
requirements differs from case to case. Such minimum requirements can be the result of 
specific inter-institutional agreements (as in Belgium, with regard to activation), or of a 
consensus established among the lower level governments (as in the Swiss case, with the non-
binding guidelines issued by the inter-cantonal cooperation conference). They can be 
motivated predominantly by concern for individual and institutional moral hazard (Belgium 
is a telling case), but their motivation can also be broader, encompassing the quality of social 
rights for citizens (Austria is an example). 
In the context of the broader research project on the feasibility and added value of an EUBS in 
which this paper fits, one should distinguish between minimum requirements with regard to 
the benefit side of UI and minimum requirements with regard to UI activation. Minimum 
requirements can be imposed with regard to the coverage and generosity of UI benefits, to 
ensure the macro-economic stabilisation effects of unemployment schemes supported by the 
EU; this rationale for minimum requirements (on the benefit side) is discussed in Task 1C of 
the broader research project. In contrast, minimum requirements with regard to activation aim 
to prevent behaviour from lower levels of government that negatively affect the risk for which 
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they are (re)insured. Requirements that enforce a minimum quality and/or quantity of 
activation policies can prevent Member States from shirking their responsibilities to activate 
their UI caseload, which in the context of an EUBS would be co-financed by the EU. In other 
words, minimum requirements on the benefit side aim to promote an optimal design of the 
national insurance policy (which is reinsured by the EU), given risks that are supposed to 
occur exogenously, while minimum requirements for activation aim to prevent behaviour that 
increases the risk in an endogenous way. Since this study is concerned with institutional moral 
hazard, it focuses on minimum requirements in the context of activation policies. The 
development of EU guidelines on activation, with the Youth Guarantee being the latest step, 
can be seen as a prefiguration of such ‘minimum requirements’ with regard to the quality of 
national activation policies. 
Another feature of the institutional architecture of unemployment regulation that we discern 
is the use of performance measurement and management. The behaviour and efforts of agents 
(or in our case sometimes lower levels of government) are monitored on the basis of indicators 
set ex ante. It is possible that performance is judged against predetermined target values for 
these indicators. Furthermore, financial incentives can be tied to performance. This practice is 
relatively common in public reforms that have been inspired by New Public Management 
(Mosley, 2011, pp. 6-7).  
4. An analytical grid to compare country cases 
The summary analysis of factors contributing to the salience of institutional moral hazard in 
the preceding section motivates the particular analytical grid that we use to map the countries 
under examination. This analytical grid simplifies the reality in our country cases somewhat 
(but not very much) by distinguishing only two broad types of benefits: unemployment 
benefits (in most of the countries conceived of as a social insurance policy, at least historically) 
and SA benefits for able-bodied adults (typically residual, and means-tested to some extent). 
For each of these broad types, we discuss the regulation of the benefits (the ‘passive side’ of 
unemployment regulation) and the regulation of activation (the ‘active side’ of unemployment 
regulation) separately; this yields four columns, corresponding to the four main policy 
components of what we label, by way of short-cut, the ‘regulation of unemployment’. 
Australia is exceptional, in that there is only one major unemployment benefit, which covers 
nearly the whole unemployment caseload: Newstart Allowance (NSA). NSA is universal but 
features, qua implementation, characteristics of SA (see the country fiche on Australia in the 
appendix) Therefore, the Australian analytical grid has only two columns. The US is 
exceptional as well. Due to the fragmented US SA system, the US analytical grid includes three 
benefit schemes: UI, TANF and Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, 
formerly called ‘Food Stamps’). 
Each country is characterised on the basis of this analytical grid. For each of the country cases 
and for each of the four policy components shown in the columns in Table 1 below, we describe 
the degree of decentralisation (i.e. the flexibility admitted at the lower level), making a 
distinction between decentralisation with regard to the design of policies (row 1) and 
decentralisation with regard to the implementation of policies (row 2). ‘Design’ encompasses 
both the formal regulation of policies (in essence, who decides about the legislation?), and the 
definition of policy goals.  
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Table 1. An analytical grid of the regulation of unemployment in multi-tiered systems 
  Unemploy-
ment 
benefits  
Activation of 
individuals 
with 
unemploy-
ment 
benefits 
Unemploy-
ment-related 
SA 
Activation of 
individuals 
with SA 
benefits  
1 Degree of decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on lower level) 
w.r.t. design of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
    
2 Degree of decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on lower level) 
w.r.t. implementation of the policy  
    
3 Budgetary responsibility     
4 Budgetary transfers between 
levels of government? 
    
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per capita basis) 
    
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegation? 
    
7 Indicators used in the monitoring 
of lower-level performance by 
higher level (on the basis of: input, 
output and outcome)? 
    
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
    
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards applied by the 
higher level at the lower level? 
    
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: perception 
of, concern for, and approach to 
problems of institutional moral 
hazard? 
  
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: approach 
to principal-agent issues? 
  
12 Contribution to macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the benefit system 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
Rows 3, 4 and 5 concern the budgetary responsibilities for benefits and activation programmes 
(and associated services), the way in which these budgetary responsibilities are organised, and 
the related distributional consequences. In row 3, we describe the division of budgetary 
responsibilities. Simply put, the level of government that bears the budgetary burden of a 
programme is the level that has the budgetary responsibility. However, we want to distinguish 
between multi-tiered systems in which the federal or central level directly pays out benefits to 
individuals (or directly provides activation services to individuals) and multi-tiered systems 
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in which lower levels of government pay out the benefits (or provide services) and are 
compensated for this by a fiscal transfer from the federal or central level (for instance, a block 
grant, or an open-ended reimbursement system). In the latter case, there is flow of funds 
between governments; in the former case, there is no flow of funds between governments. 
(The latter case may also be labelled ‘reinsurance’, with the federal or central level of 
government re-insuring the insurance policy organised by the lower level, whilst in the former 
case the federal or central level plays directly the role of insurer vis-à-vis individual citizens.) 
This distinction is made in row 4 of the grid.      
Most often, funds are transferred from the higher level of government to a lower level of 
government, but it is also possible that lower levels of government contribute to costs that are 
a federal or central responsibility. In contrast, the absence of budgetary transfers between 
levels of government implies that both the central/federal level of government and the lower 
levels of government raise their own revenues to finance their respective UI or SA 
responsibilities. The distinction made in row 4 is relevant to the broader research project 
undertaken by the Consortium: an ‘equivalent EUBS’ would imply transfers between the EU 
and national governments; a ‘genuine EUBS’ would not imply transfers between the EU and 
national governments. As a matter of fact, the distinction highlighted in row 4 is not always 
straightforward to apply. As we explain below, we have chosen to describe the American 
system of Extended Benefits and Emergency Benefits as a system that is not characterised by 
transfers between levels of governments, because in its spirit it corresponds to what we would 
call a ‘genuine EUBS’. However, the Extended Benefits and Emergency Benefits are disbursed 
to individual American citizens by the states; state accounts are reimbursed by the federal 
governments.  
Row 5 (‘structural redistribution’) concerns an outcome that is independent of the budgetary 
technique specified in row 4. We take a per capita benchmark as our vantage point: we speak 
of structural redistribution if there is more funding per capita for the programme under review 
in some of the relevant lower level units of a country than in other units, on a structural basis. 
In practice, structural redistribution occurs when the size of the programme caseloads varies 
structurally across these units. Consider, by way of example, a federal state with regions: if the 
federal level is responsible for the UI budget and the UI caseload as a percentage of the 
population varies across the regions, then there will be a structural redistribution, at least prima 
facie.  
An important issue in the overall research project to which this paper contributes concerns the 
‘permanent’ or ‘non-permanent’ character of transfers associated with an eventual EUBS (see 
the Inception Report on ‘permanent transfers’, notably the description of Task 1B). The 
relationship between this notion of ‘permanent transfers’ (as distinguished from ‘non-
permanent transfers’) and the concepts used in our analytical grid should not lead to 
confusion. Most of the multi-tiered systems in the eight countries under examination imply 
‘permanent transfers’, either because the higher level of government pays individual benefits 
(or services) to citizens on a permanent basis, or because the higher level of government 
compensates the lower level via a direct flow of funds on a permanent basis. Therefore, we do 
not provide a separate entry in the analytical grid to distinguish ‘permanent’ from ‘non-
permanent’ transfers.8 However, in some cases non-permanent transfers exist (for instance, the 
                                                   
8 In this respect, the analytical grid we apply here differs from the initial analytical grid proposed in the 
tender (see Tender, Table 2); we became aware that the expression ‘permanent transfers’ in the initial 
analytical grid generated confusion between our analysis and the concepts used in the tender and the 
Inception Report.  
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American ‘Extended Benefit’ and ‘Emergency Benefit’ programmes, which are temporary by 
design); if so, the occurrence of non-permanent systems is explicitly mentioned, either in row 
3 or 4.  
In row 6, we indicate whether the decentralisation should be qualified as ‘managerial’ versus 
‘political’, building on a distinction introduced by Mosley (2011). In the same row, we also 
indicate whether ‘delegation’ is a feature of the governance system that needs to be 
highlighted. As explained in section 1, if ‘delegation’ is not mentioned in the grid, that does 
not imply that the delegation of powers is absent in the regulation of unemployment in the 
country under examination; if it is not mentioned, it means that the delegation that may exist 
is not sufficiently relevant to our main analytical focus in this paper. Rows 7-9 concern 
institutional moral hazard and principal-agent issues, where relevant, and answer the 
following questions: Do ‘higher levels’ monitor the performance of ‘lower levels’, and, if so, 
how (row 7)? Can we qualify the system that is applied as one of ‘minimum requirements’ 
(row 8)? Are sanctions/rewards applied (row 9)? In row 10, we summarise this part of the 
analysis: How salient is institutional moral hazard (not just as an objective feature of the 
system, but also in terms of public perception and public concern)? If it is a salient feature, 
how is it dealt with? In row 11, we indicate whether principal-agent problems are an important 
feature of the system under review (in our survey, principal-agent problems relate to 
managerial decentralisation, as we define it).  
Finally, in row 12, we assess the contribution of the national benefit system to macroeconomic 
stabilisation in the case of an employment shock, on the basis of Dolls et al., cf. Figure 1 in 
section 5 below (Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a; Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012b).  
Ideally, in such a grid one should also take on board the interplay between the broader 
regulation of labour markets on the one hand, and benefit and activation systems on the other 
hand; an important question is whether labour market institutions are homogenous or 
heterogeneous at the relevant lower level. Together, the regulation of employment and the 
broader labour market institutions make up a system that is able to deal with socio-economic 
risks linked to changes in economic and labour market conditions. However, the scope of this 
survey and the time invested in it do not allow us to take on board this broader dimension.9 
We recommend this for further research. 
Substantive policy and institutional changes have often coincided in recent history. We 
identify important moments of institutional change in the detailed descriptions of the country 
cases (they are much more detailed than the summary in the country fiches in the appendix to 
this paper). These detailed descriptions can be found in a separate appendix to the 
Consortium’s report. Further research should elaborate upon the possibility of applying both 
a notion of ‘consistency’ and of ‘consistent institutional change’ to assess systems of 
unemployment regulation. ‘Consistency’ would not mean that the analysis ‘approves’ of 
specific changes from a normative sense (such as social justice); instead, the term ‘consistency’ 
would signal a certain logic that has been applied simultaneously and coherently to 
substantive policy changes and institutional changes. The Hartz reforms in Germany seem to 
be a case of ‘consistent institutional change’. The same might be said about the transition from 
AFDC to TANF in the US. 
                                                   
9 In this respect, the analytical grid developed in this paper differs from the initial analytical grid 
proposed in the tender. 
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5. Generosity, eligibility, contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation 
and budgetary incidence 
We start with an observation on one of the fundamental objectives of unemployment benefit 
schemes: macroeconomic stabilisation. Institutional moral hazard can be seen, to some extent, 
as an inevitable corollary of the insurance mechanisms that generate stabilisation. Simplifying 
for the sake of the argument in this paper, one might say that the challenge for multi-tiered 
social systems is to achieve as much overall stabilisation as possible, with as little institutional 
moral hazard as possible. The assessment by Dolls et al. of the relative importance of automatic 
stabilisers includes four of the eight countries in our study (the US, Germany, Belgium and 
Denmark).10 It shows an important divide between the US on one hand and the three European 
countries on the other hand; in the case of an ‘employment shock’, macroeconomic stabilisers 
are less important in the US than in many other countries, while Denmark, Germany and 
Belgium display strong automatic stabilisers in a comparative perspective even when 
compared to other European countries. Moreover, the benefit system plays only a limited role 
in the overall automatic stabilisation capacity of the US system, whilst benefits are important 
drivers of stabilisation in Belgium and Germany, and very important drivers of stabilisation 
in Denmark. Figure 1 illustrates this: 
Figure 1. Decomposition of income stabilisation coefficients in the case of an unemployment shock 
  
Source: Our own rendition of results by Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a. 
 
                                                   
10 Another relevant source with regard to stabilisation is: Fernando-Salgado, M., Figari, F., Sutherland, 
H. & Tumino, A. (2014). For the US, there is also the study by Auerbach, A. & Feenberg, D. (2000), which, 
however, discusses the role of the federal income tax rather than unemployment benefits as automatic 
stabilisers. 
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Since UI benefits account by far for the largest part of stabilisation in case of an unemployment 
shock, the differential generosity and coverage of unemployment benefits obviously is an 
important explanatory factor. As explained in the US country case (see the appendix to the 
Consortium’s report), the generosity of unemployment benefits in the US is low, notably in 
terms of duration: in most states the duration of regular UI benefits is limited to 26 weeks. 
Admittedly, one should add to this assessment of automatic stabilisers that the US 
administration also applies a system of Extended Unemployment Benefits and Emergency 
Benefits to counter the impact of recessions, which is not integrated into the assessment of the 
regular system by Dolls et al.11 However, the basic observation remains that the generosity of 
the US unemployment benefit system is very limited. 
The generosity of benefit systems can be gauged by gross or net replacement rates. As we 
explain below, this is a narrow definition of generosity, since it only applies to the individuals 
who are eligible for benefits. However, the comparison of replacement rates reveals as such 
already a strikingly diverse pattern. For the countries under examination, Figure 2 and Figure 
3 show the net replacement rates, as calculated by the OECD on the basis of its tax-benefit 
model for 2013, and compare these to the median net replacement rates for the whole OECD 
and the whole EU. The figures are averages for four family types and two earnings levels, as 
a percentage of the wages used. Figure 2 shows the average net replacement rates for these 
family types at the initial phase of unemployment. Figure 3 shows the average net replacement 
rates over 60 months of unemployment. We distinguish the net replacement rates for two 
situations, one where the family does not qualify for cash housing assistance (HB) or SA ’top-
ups’ (blue bars), and one where the family does qualify for such ’top-ups’; the impact of these 
’top-ups’ is indicated by the red bars in the figures.12 Hence, the blue bars indicate the 
generosity (in terms of replacement rates) of UI, and the sum of the blue and the red bars 
                                                   
11 In their baseline analysis, Dolls et al. do not account for the Extended Benefits (EB) programme in the 
US because it does not kick in automatically in all states. The EB programme provides an additional 13 
to 20 weeks of unemployment benefits to workers receiving unemployment insurance in states that 
meet certain thresholds in terms of their unemployment rates. This increased duration of 
unemployment benefits slightly increases the stabilisation coefficient for the US and, thus, reduces its 
difference from the average stabilisation coefficient in the EU (Dolls et al., 2012a, NBER version of 2010, 
footnote 18, p. 15). 
12 The data in Figure 2 refer to the initial phase of unemployment, but following any waiting period. 
Any income taxes payable on unemployment benefits are determined in relation to annualised benefit 
values (i.e. monthly values multiplied by 12), even if the maximum benefit duration is shorter than 12 
months. The four family types are: single person, no children; single earner married couple, no children; 
lone parent, two children; single earner married couple, two children. For married couples, the 
percentage of average wage relates to the previous earnings of the ‘unemployed’ spouse only; the 
second spouse is assumed to be ’inactive’ with no earnings and no recent employment history in a one-
earner couple. Two levels of earnings are considered for each of the family types: 67% and 100% of the 
average wage. Where receipt of SA or other minimum-income benefits is subject to activity tests (such 
as active job search or being ‘available’ for work), these requirements are assumed to be met. Children 
are aged four and six and neither childcare benefits nor childcare costs are considered. The replacement 
rates are calculated after tax and including unemployment benefits and family benefits. In the situation 
of ‘no top-ups’, no SA top-ups or cash housing benefits are assumed to be available in either the in-work 
or out-of-work situation. In the situation with ‘top-ups’ (indicated with SA and HB in the figures), SA 
and other means-tested benefits are assumed to be available subject to relevant income conditions. 
Housing costs are assumed equal to 20% of average wage. Data are retrieved from the OECD’s website 
on 8.8.2015 (with authors’ own calculations for the OECD and EU average values in Figure 2, blue bars; 
OECD site provides median values). 
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indicates the generosity of the combination of UI and SA (and housing benefits). These figures 
show important cross-country variation with regard to the generosity of the systems, with 
important differences between the protection of short-term and long-term unemployed 
individuals, and a substantial variation in the weight of SA versus UI, notably in the case of 
long-term unemployment. 
Figure 2. Initial net replacement rates when unemployed, 2013 
 
Note: EU average refers to EU-27 (without Cyprus). 
Source: OECD tax-benefit model 2013, own calculations. 
 
Figure 3. Five-year average net replacement rates when unemployed, 2013 
 
Note: Cf. Figure 2. 
Source: OECD tax-benefit model 2013, own calculations. 
 
Net replacement rates measure the generosity of benefit systems for those who are recipients; 
obviously, from a macro perspective, the overall generosity of a benefit system also depends 
on the strictness of the applied eligibility criteria. Figure 4 compares the strictness of eligibility 
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of UI according to an OECD study by Langenbucher (2015), on which we rely in our extensive 
country case studies. 
Figure 4. Overall strictness of eligibility criteria 
 
Source: Langenbucher, 2015, p. 27. 
 
The scores for every country consist of three elements: availability requirements and suitable 
work criteria, the strictness of job search monitoring and the strictness of sanctions which can 
be applied. There is no prima facie correlation (either positive or negative) between the 
generosity of UI benefits as measured by net replacement rates and the strictness of eligibility. 
The US and Australia have the least generous UI benefits in our selection and the second and 
sixth highest scores on strictness of eligibility, for the cases we examine. While Belgium has 
one of the most generous UI benefits in our selection, its score on strictness of eligibility is 
median in that sample. The shape of the eligibility criteria is also influenced by the country-
specific institutional set-up. For example, the Australian NSA functions as the unemployment 
benefit of last resort (there is no large Australian SA scheme) and consequently has almost 
universal coverage (OECD, 2012, p. 157). For that reason, the sanctions in the Australian 
system are amongst the least strict of the countries studied by Langenbucher: in such a context, 
severe sanctions for repeat offenders are seen as punitive and counterproductive (OECD, 2012, 
pp. 29-30, 102, 159). However, perhaps just because sanctions and entitlement conditions are 
so relaxed, the strictness of both job search requirements and monitoring thereof is so high 
that it still ranks third among the countries we examine. The Australian example highlights 
the difficulty of interpreting these data. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a stark cross-
country variation in the strictness of eligibility, even between countries which are relatively 
similar – such as Austria and Switzerland. 
Figures 5-7 illustrate the budgetary incidence of UI and SA benefits and active labour market 
programmes (ALMPs) in the eight countries under review, on the basis of OECD SOCX. In 
order to gauge the budgetary incidence of SA benefits, we have to rely on a broader category, 
which is labelled ‘other social policy areas’ in OECD SOCX. 
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Figure 5. Public spending on UI as a % of GDP 
 
Source: OECD SOCX. 
 
Figure 6. Public spending on ‘other social policy areas’ as a % of GDP  
 
Source: OECD SOCX. 
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Figure 7. Public spending on ALMPs as a % of GDP 
 
Source: OECD SOCX. 
 
Figures 5 and 7 demonstrate very different patterns of public spending across the countries 
under examination: spending on UI and activation is very low in the United States, while it is 
rather high in countries such as Belgium and Denmark. One could argue that low expenditure 
on unemployment benefits in the US is related to the fact that Americans are more susceptible 
to concern for moral hazard in social insurance than Belgians; but the ‘residual’ concern for 
institutional moral hazard in the US – given these limited levels of expenditure – is ultimately 
perhaps less than in a country like Belgium. Figure 5 also indicates that unemployment 
spending in the US fluctuates more than, for example, in Belgium (cf. the ratio between the 
highest and the lowest percentage over the past period for each of the countries). In other 
words, US spending is more cyclical but, because it is so limited, it contributes little to 
stabilisation. 
Figure 6 should be interpreted carefully. The OECD SOCX database has a broad miscellaneous 
category – ‘other social policy areas’ – which does not only include SA programmes as we 
define them in our country cases. Nevertheless, these data yield a meaningful comparison. In 
countries with an insurance-based support system such as Belgium and Germany, the role for 
income-tested programmes is usually limited and aimed primarily at those who have 
exhausted their unemployment insurance entitlements and are eligible for unemployment 
assistance or social assistance. In countries such as Canada and Switzerland, the role of 
income-tested programmes is considerably larger. In some of the countries considered here, 
income-tested social programmes have seen an increase in recent years. This has been 
reinforced in the context of the economic crisis in order to ensure support for the least well-
off. 
OECD SOCX spending data on ALMPs, displayed in Figure 7, need once again to be 
considered with caution since its classification is restricted to measures which are ‘targeted’. 
This excludes, for example, in-work benefits that are available to all employees whose earnings 
fall below a threshold (including the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States), measures 
that target all members of a group at statistical risk, and wage subsidies for an indefinite 
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period. Moreover, data for some of the countries, particularly the non-European ones, can 
suffer from the exclusion of programmes that should be included. So the coverage of ALMPs 
at subnational level may well be underestimated. Bearing this in mind, Figure 7 shows that 
spending on activation is highest in Denmark (a typical characteristic of Scandinavian welfare 
states), followed by Germany, Belgium (both continental welfare states, with spending levels 
that are generally between those of Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon welfare states) and Austria 
(a hybrid of the Scandinavian and the continental type of welfare states), and that it is lowest 
in the US, Canada and Australia (Anglo-Saxon welfare states). In other words, we obtain a 
picture broadly similar to that of UI spending (see Figure 5). 
 It is likely that the differences in generosity and eligibility – and therefore differences in the 
budgetary impact – are also reflected in different redistribution patterns within the countries 
examined. It is important to note here that the type of redistribution we discuss in this 
paragraph is of a different kind to what is reflected in row 5 of the analytical grid. This (and 
the next) paragraph concerns interpersonal redistribution, while row 5 of the analytical grid 
relates to redistribution among geographical units. These two types of redistribution are 
related but not the same. The standard approach to measuring interpersonal redistribution 
used by the OECD covers gross income (market income combined with public and private 
transfers) and cash disposable income (gross income minus personal income tax and social 
contributions) (OECD, 2008, pp. 98-99).13 While this approach has some limitations (OECD, 
2008, pp. 117-118), its major limitation for our study is that it does not allow disaggregation of 
income data – specifically income from benefits – to the level of unemployment related benefits 
(i.e. unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and unemployment related social 
assistance).  
However, the OECD (2015) estimates the impact of UI on earnings volatility (Figure 8) and 
inequality (Figure 9). The impact of unemployment insurance is identified by focusing on the 
proportional differences in earnings volatility (or inequality) in the actual situation – when the 
unemployed receive unemployment benefits, if eligible – and a counterfactual setting in the 
absence of insurance (zero benefits). The earnings volatility analysis is carried out separately 
for three population subgroups, on the basis of (long-term) earnings terciles. The data are 
based on simulations over ten years for continuously active persons. The analysis should be 
interpreted with some caution, since it does not take into account the impact of other benefits, 
such as SA, or tax credits, and takes unemployment rates and wage structures as given (OECD, 
2015, pp. 191-192). However, it highlights the important role UI actually plays across the 
countries. Three clusters can be identified in Figure 8: Belgium and Denmark, in which UI has 
a very strong effect on earnings volatility in the bottom tercile; Switzerland, Australia and the 
US, in which UI has only a marginal effect on all terciles; and Austria and Germany, which are 
in between these two clusters. However, Danish and Austrian UI (and to a lesser extent also 
German) also has a low but discernible effect on earnings volatility in the middle tercile. Figure 
9 displays the impact on earnings inequality in the short and long terms.14 Across the board, 
UI has a greater impact on earnings volatility than on earnings inequality (it is more an 
                                                   
13 The approach starts with factor income (income from wages, salaries, self-employment and property), 
market income (factor income combined with occupational and private pensions). Furthermore, 
disposable cash income is then often adjusted to reflect differences in household needs through an 
equivalised scale, resulting in equivalised disposable income. 
14 Long-term earnings inequality is the earnings inequality across individuals in terms of their average 
earnings over ten years; short-term inequality is the earnings inequality across individuals within years 
averaged over ten years. 
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instrument for income smoothing than for income redistribution), but the differences between 
the countries in terms of inequality impact are sizable: the equalising effect is relatively 
important in Denmark and Belgium, very weak in Australia, the US and Switzerland, and 
somewhere in between in Germany and Austria.  
Figure 8. The proportional change in the coefficient of variation due to effective unemployment 
insurance by long-term tercile 
 
* Based on simulations over ten years for continuously active persons. Simulations refer to individuals aged 15 to 54 in the 
reference year (20-54 for Denmark).  
Source: OECD, 2015, p. 192. 
Figure 9. The proportional change in the gini coefficient of short-term and long-term inequality due to 
effective unemployment insurance 
 
* Based on simulations over ten years for continuously active persons. Simulations refer to individuals aged 15 to 54 in the 
reference year (20-54 for Denmark). 
Source: OECD, 2015, p. 192. 
With the important caveats mentioned in the previous paragraphs (most important, that this 
only concerns the effects of effective UI), such differences between the countries might shed 
some light on differences in concern for individual moral hazard, differences in the approach 
to activation and, by extension, differences in concern for institutional moral hazard. A large 
reduction of inequality, or in other words, a large redistributive effect of UI, equates to a large 
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
%
Bottom tercile Middle tercile Top tercile
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
%
Long-term inequality Short-term earnings inequality
26 | VANDENBROUCKE & LUIGJES 
 
budgetary effort. For all cases examined here, with the partial exception of the US (only in 
times when UI is not extended by the federal government), UI benefits are centrally or 
federally funded. Also in all cases examined here, activation is decentralised or delegated to a 
lower level of government or government agency. For this reason, it is likely that the level of 
budgetary impact of benefits has some influence on activation strategies, but also – and more 
important – on the level of concern over whether these strategies are effectively and efficiently 
implemented. 
6. In most countries, concern for institutional moral hazard is a corollary 
of multi-tiered unemployment regulation 
Our survey cannot be summarised in a few straightforward conclusions. We study four 
interrelated policy domains (UI benefits, UI activation, SA benefits, SA activation).15 In five of 
the eight cases, three levels of governments are involved in at least one of these policy domains 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, i.e. all the European cases).16 Moreover, 
in many countries political authorities delegate the implementation of policies to (more or less) 
autonomous public institutions, notably PES; in two of the countries under examination, we 
considered it necessary to include this delegation process in our analysis. In order to grasp this 
complexity and to understand the essential conclusions for each of the cases, the reader should 
consult the country fiches in the appendix and/or the extensive case studies available as a 
separate appendix to the Consortium’s report. This section summarily highlights some of the 
most relevant features of the multi-tiered regulation of unemployment in the countries which 
we studied. In section 7, a general conclusion is formulated, focusing on UI and the relevance 
of our results with regard to an eventual EUBS. 
Given the limited generosity and the strictness of eligibility of American UI benefits (cf. 
Figures 8 and 9) and other factors documented in the US case study, one might think that, as 
a consequence, (residual) public concern for individual moral hazard and institutional moral 
hazard in UI is not important in the US. Or, as explained earlier, the US and the EU may 
exemplify, today, different equilibria in their public opinion: Europeans are probably less ready 
to reinsure their relatively generous national UI benefit systems at the EU level, compared to 
Americans, who accept a degree of federal reinsurance and co-insurance of relatively 
ungenerous UI benefit systems. However true that may be, such an assessment underrates the 
salience of moral hazard, both at the individual and the institutional level, in the American 
policy debate. Concerns about individual and institutional moral hazard were important 
drivers of US welfare reform in the 1990s, notably in the transition from AFDC to TANF. 
Welfare reform put SA activation much higher on the agenda, and open-ended funding of 
AFDC was replaced by block grants for TANF. In the domain of UI, the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) implements a sophisticated balance between certain forms of 
interstate solidarity organised at the federal level and fiscal accountability for UI at the state 
level; hence, FUTA can be seen as a financial mechanism to prevent the institutional moral 
hazard that is a corollary of this solidarity. Moreover, American UI is not only limited in 
generosity and characterised by strict eligibility; in addition, ‘experience rating’ is applied to 
fight moral hazard with employers in their hiring and firing policies. There is also an 
overarching approach to ‘workforce development’ which aims to promote activation and 
                                                   
15 Australia is an exception, since only one type of benefit is studied. 
16 In Canada, municipalities are involved in SA and activation regimes only in Ontario. 
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training in all the states but with limited direct links with benefit schemes at the level of 
individuals. However, the system of workforce development has been subject to several 
reforms that all included changes in the accountability framework, which signals the 
importance of institutional moral hazard in this policy domain as well. All this makes the US 
case quite different from the other cases we examine, calling for a different understanding of 
the role of moral hazard in the US context. It may explain why institutional moral hazard does 
not seem high on today’s political agenda, despite some important elements of interstate 
solidarity at the federal level. Simultaneously, the block grant system and ‘workforce 
development’ imply federal concerns with regard to the effectiveness and efficiency of state 
policies, for which specific solutions have been developed. Furthermore, when federal dollars 
are used directly for the financing of UI benefits, the federal government shows more concern 
for activation and enacts legislation that links benefits to job search requirements. In short, the 
American political culture creates a different constellation than the one we know in most EU 
countries, but concern for institutional moral hazard in the relationship between the federal 
administration and the states is far from absent.  
Our examination of the German, Swiss and Austrian cases suggests that these countries share 
a policy problem but have chosen different solutions. The common feature was growing 
concern about the dichotomy between UI activation and SA activation, and about disparities 
between the SA activation record of the lower levels of government responsible for SA (the 
municipalities in Germany, the Länder in Austria and the cantons in Switzerland). However, 
the solutions chosen by these countries are different. In Germany, institutional reform was a 
logical corollary of the Hartz reforms. It was characterised by institutional integration and 
centralisation of unemployment regulation, with an important and forceful overarching 
steering role given to the federal BA (the German PES), both for UI activation (ALG I, since the 
Hartz reforms) and SA activation (ALG II, since the Hartz reforms). In Austria, the federal 
government opted for a harmonisation of UI activation and SA activation (i.e. a truly uniform 
approach to both caseloads) and a de facto harmonisation of the most important parameters of 
SA benefits across the Länder. However, Austria did not centralise SA activation in the German 
way. The AMS (the Austrian PES) took over the responsibility for SA activation, but PES 
offices were not merged with local welfare offices as in Germany. In the Austrian system, local 
offices have significant leeway in SA activation, but the local approaches are streamlined by 
standardised work processes and minimum requirements with regard to the SA activation and 
UI activation. In Switzerland, loopholes that allowed the shifting of caseloads from SA to UI 
have been closed for the most part, and institutional moral hazard at the level of the cantons 
(who are responsible for the both UI activation and SA activation) has been addressed, to some 
extent, through a system consisting of minimum requirements, performance measurement 
and a degressive funding formula which limits federal funding for cantons with high 
unemployment rates. This seems to have limited the salience of institutional moral hazard in 
the public debate, but mismatches between SA activation and UI activation persist in 
Switzerland.    
Belgium and Canada, however different in size, history and political culture, display a similar 
architectural feature with regard to UI, which they also share with Switzerland (the Swiss case 
was already discussed to some extent in the previous paragraph but is revisited below). Both 
in Canada and Belgium, UI benefits are regulated and funded at the federal level, while UI 
activation is decentralised (to the provinces in Canada and the regions in Belgium). SA benefits 
and activation are decentralised, to the provinces in Canada and the regions (at least since the 
Sixth State Reform) and municipalities in Belgium. However, there is a striking difference with 
regard to the salience of institutional moral hazard in UI in the Belgian and Canadian debates. 
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Concern for institutional moral hazard in the domain of UI was very high on the agenda in 
Belgium and led to an important architectural and policy reform in 2004, based on a formal 
agreement between the federal level and the regions; this agreement boosted activation by the 
regional public employment services (PES) and made their approaches more uniform across 
the regions. The Belgian inter-institutional agreement can be interpreted as a negotiated 
system of ‘minimum requirements’, with detailed and rather constraining procedures with 
regard to the follow-up and activation of the UI caseload. It underscores the considerable 
complexity that such a multi-tiered system of regulation entails, which may be an important 
warning in the context of an eventual EUBS. Simultaneously, the Belgian constellation 
highlights the importance of the European guidelines on activation, which define a general yet 
important common framework for the regions and the federation.   
In contrast to Belgium, in Canada, the Labour Market Development Agreement (LMDA) and 
a rather loose system of performance management leave the large degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by the provinces in the realm of activation largely intact. Moreover, the introduction of 
LMDAs has, to a certain extent, been the consequence of attempts by the Canadian federal 
government to appease the call for more autonomy by the Canadian provinces. Canadian UI 
is clearly less generous than Belgian UI in the case of longer-term unemployment, and, until 
now, the SA caseload has been rather marginal in Belgium vis-à-vis the unemployment 
caseload. This makes UI more important, in terms of caseload, in Belgium than in Canada.17 
Additionally, due to tightening of UI eligibility requirements by the Canadian federal 
government in the mid-1990s, the Canadian UI caseload has decreased starkly. This move can 
be seen as a cost shift by the federal government towards the provinces, who now serve 
increasingly larger SA caseloads. Moreover, Canadian provinces already had the 
responsibility over policy areas that overlapped with UI activation (such as education policies, 
SA and activation of SA). Failed constitutional reforms and a barely rejected Quebec 
independence referendum pressed home the message that provinces were keen to defend their 
competences against federal infringements. Devolution of UI activation was a way to bring 
activation services together at the provincial level, to ensure that those policies responded to 
local concerns and that any overlap was mitigated – but also to assert the political autonomy 
of the provinces. Together with the large discrepancy in the unemployment record of the three 
Belgian regions, these factors may explain why institutional moral hazard in UI is so much 
higher on the Belgian agenda than on the Canadian agenda. Belgium exemplifies a reform 
process which is, as yet, unsettled. The Sixth State Reform grants even more autonomy to the 
regions with regard to activation and places trust in the overall financing system of the 
federation and the regions, rather than in a specific unemployment- or employment-related 
mechanism that would reward the regions for successful activation policies. Simultaneously, 
the federal and regional governments recently agreed on a rather detailed ‘normative 
framework’ with regard to the monitoring (and, possibly, sanctioning) of unemployed 
individuals, which creates a permanent system of ‘minimum requirements’ with respect to 
regional policies that will be embedded in federal legislation. How all this will work out 
remains uncharted territory, as explained in the country fiche on Belgium.  
Because of the interactions between SA and UI, we linked our discussion of the Swiss case 
with our discussion of the German and Austrian cases. As explained earlier, with regard to UI, 
the Swiss, the Belgian and the Canadian cases display similar fundamental features: 
                                                   
17 This situation is gradually changing, with increasing numbers of people living on SA in Belgium. The 
Canadian SA and UI caseloads have been decreasing in absolute terms, but the UI caseload has 
dwindled the most, to almost half the size of the SA caseload in relative terms. 
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centralised budgetary responsibility for UI benefits, decentralisation for UI activation. 
Compared to Belgium, with its strong perception of institutional moral hazard in public policy 
debates, the Swiss constellation is different. First of all, the generosity of UI for longer-term 
unemployed individuals is much less; for long-term unemployed individuals, the Swiss 
system relies much more on SA than the Belgian system (cf. Figure 6). It is not happenstance 
that the Swiss perception of institutional moral hazard was focused on the interactions 
between SA and UI, notably on the ‘dumping of caseloads’, which is not an issue in Belgium 
(up until now). As explained earlier, specific reforms seem to have limited the salience of 
institutional moral hazard in this respect in the Swiss public debate. Secondly, the autonomy 
of the cantons is a strong factor in the Swiss political tradition and seems to play out differently 
than in Belgium. Reforms have harmonised UI activation somewhat, but the differences that 
remain are accepted as political choices made by the cantons, whilst interregional differences 
in unemployment regulation are very sensitive in Belgium. Despite the persistent dichotomy 
between UI and SA in Switzerland, there has been no federal action to harmonise SA 
regulation.18 Instead, in Switzerland there has been much cooperation between institutions 
that are responsible for (among others) SA, disability and unemployment benefits. This 
cooperation was done on an equal basis, reflecting the respect that the autonomy of the cantons 
was afforded by the federal government. The Swiss debate over SA is illustrative for how 
strong the political autonomy of the cantons is embedded in the system and how this 
influences the political perception of and concern for institutional moral hazard.19   
Denmark faces similar policy challenges as other countries do, since activation for both the UI 
and the SA caseload is a local responsibility, while the funding of benefits is a responsibility 
shared by the central and local level. However, the Danish case features original solutions. 
Problems of institutional moral hazard have been perceived (labelled as ‘non-compliance’) and 
addressed by the ‘reimbursement model’, which is a combination of minimum requirements, 
detailed monitoring of local activation efforts and financial incentives. The Danish system is 
designed to enforce local compliance, which underscores the perception of institutional moral 
hazard as a problem. Through the reimbursement model, municipalities are required to 
finance a part of the benefit and activation costs, the level of which depends on several factors, 
such as compliance with the minimum requirements or the types of services delivered. This 
combination makes the Danish system complex and requires a substantial administrative 
effort. Central regulation and administrative overload are perceived as reducing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of local policies, because local flexibility is too limited. The difficult 
balancing act between central control to prevent institutional moral hazard and local flexibility 
explains a succession of reforms. Currently, a new reform is underway, where, to strike a new 
balance, the Danish pendulum will probably swing towards more local flexibility, along with 
a larger local fiscal contribution. 
Australia is an outlier in our eight cases. It has only one major unemployment-related benefit, 
the NSA, already referred to in section 4. NSA is centrally regulated and financed, and the 
implementation of activation policies is privatised. Policy experimentation with full 
privatisation in the late 1990s and early 2000s generated incentives for private agencies to 
                                                   
18 Instead, the cantons themselves have devised some common non-binding guidelines. 
19 In a sense, this is comparable to the autonomy of municipalities in Belgium, which is deeply 
entrenched in the political system; differences in SA activation, for which Belgian municipalities are 
responsible, have (up until now) rarely been perceived as problems of institutional moral hazard. The 
autonomy of the Belgian regions is also deeply entrenched, but interregional differences in UI activation 
have been a hot issue.  
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‘park’ their hard-to-place clients. To counter these incentives, the government implemented 
an increasingly strict system of minimum requirements and financial incentives. Hence, to 
fight principal-agent problems in the relationship between the federal government and the 
private agencies, Australia moved from a ‘black box’ model towards more and more federal 
oversight and control. The Australian experience suggests a trade-off between the need for 
control on one hand, and the need for flexibility in activation processes on the other hand. In 
this respect, there is a certain resemblance between the Danish and the Australian experiences.      
7. Conclusion 
As already indicated, our survey cannot be summarised in a few straightforward conclusions. 
Since the various EUBS proposals examined by the Consortium concern UI, our general 
conclusion focuses on lessons to be learned with regard to UI. This general conclusion can be 
summarised as follows. The relationship between central governments that fund UI benefits 
(or intervene in their funding in specific circumstances, as in the US) and lower levels of 
government that have an impact on the unemployment caseload (notably, but not only, due 
the fact that they are responsible for UI and SA activation) is seldom described in terms of 
‘insurance’, ‘co-insurance’ or ‘reinsurance’20 and ‘institutional moral hazard’, as we coin it in 
this paper. Whatever the terminology that is used in the public debate in the countries under 
review, it seems that concern for institutional moral hazard inevitably emerges in multi-tiered 
systems in which a central government can be seen as ‘insuring’ or ‘re-insuring’, completely 
or partially, the risk of unemployment for lower levels of government. Fundamentally, the 
salience of moral hazard in the public policy debate seems to depend on the generosity (in a 
broad sense, i.e. including the strictness of the eligibility criteria) of the underlying insurance 
policies, at the level of the individuals as well as between the levels of governments involved, 
and on the readiness to organise ‘federal solidarity’ in the national public culture. With regard 
to these underlying factors of generosity, solidarity and tolerance for individual and 
institutional moral hazard, different equilibria seem to exist in different countries.  
Insofar as institutional moral hazard is an explicit public policy issue (whatever the label used 
to describe it in the public debate), different solutions are visible in different countries. In most 
of our studied cases, either centralisation, minimum requirements, conditional funding 
and/or more or less sophisticated financial incentives are applied to enhance the activation 
efforts of lower levels of government; in some countries, solutions are, at least in part, 
congenial to New Public Management. Also, most of the countries under examination 
launched important reforms over the last 20 years, motivated partly by institutional moral 
hazard. In some countries, the policy architecture still changes frequently, which underscores 
the difficulty of striking a balance between conflicting normative perspectives and interests. 
What lessons can be learned from our survey for an eventual EUBS? 
1. First of all, we should be clear about the analogy we want to draw. In order to understand 
the potential for institutional moral hazard in the context of an EUBS, it is analytically 
interesting to equate the role of the EU to the role played by the federal or central levels of 
government in national multi-tiered systems where the central level bears (part of) the 
budgetary burden of UI benefits, and to equate the role of the EU Member States to the role 
played by the regions, provinces or Länder in those systems. Such an analogy should not 
                                                   
20 Throughout this paper we use the expression ‘reinsurance’ in a generic sense. In the other papers 
delivered by the Consortium, ‘reinsurance’ denotes a specific variant of the EUBS. 
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overlook the fact that the features of the country cases under review are quite different from 
the EUBS proposals studied by the Consortium. With regard to UI benefits, there is no country 
case with an ‘equivalent system’, as defined in the Consortium’s research project, i.e. a system 
in which an EU fund would not directly target individual citizens but transfer money to the 
Member States. (We decided not to describe the American system of Extended Benefits and 
Emergency Benefits as an instance of an ‘equivalent’ system; we consider only the American 
‘loan system’ for regular UI as a true example of an equivalent system, but the latter functions 
on a temporary basis; cf. the country fiche on the US). In other words, we can learn a lot on the 
basis of such an analogy, but we should be careful when extrapolating our conclusions to 
specific multi-tiered systems that do not exist in the countries we study. 
Next to this caveat, two further remarks need to be made with regard to the notion of 
institutional moral hazard as we developed it in our country case studies.  
First, the relevance of an analogy between problems perceived in existing multi-tiered systems 
of unemployment regulation and the potential problems in the context of a hypothetical EUBS 
might be questioned for the following reason: the EUBS proposals under review exclude 
interventions in long-term unemployment (the EU benefits would be granted for a maximum 
of 12 months). Since the quality of activation policies may have a more significant impact on 
long-term unemployment than on short-term unemployment, institutional moral hazard may 
be more of a concern when long-term unemployment is reinsured or co-insured than in the 
case of short-term unemployment. In some of our case studies, we have indicated that low 
levels of generosity of long-term UI benefits may reduce concern for institutional moral hazard 
with regard to UI (US, Canada, Switzerland); this boils down to the same reasoning. However, 
for different reasons, we do not believe that this argument undermines the relevance of our 
case studies. In the US, the extension of benefits beyond 26 weeks (the duration of most regular 
state benefits) is accompanied by specific activation requirements, which suggests concern for 
institutional moral hazard that is not limited to the long-term unemployed. In Belgium, the 
minimum requirements stipulated in the Cooperation Agreement of 2004 focused as much on 
the activation of the short-term unemployed as on the activation of the long-term unemployed. 
More generally, if the scope of the analysis is extended beyond activation policies sensu stricto, 
poor economic policies which cause short-term unemployment may be as much a matter of 
concern for institutional moral hazard as poor activation policies. 
The second remark is, in a sense, more fundamental. The Consortium’s research project on the 
feasibility of an EUBS proposes specific financial mechanisms to eliminate the possibility for 
any country to be, on average, a net beneficiary of the scheme (see Task 1C for a more precise 
definition of this feature and its implementation in different EUBS variants). If such financial 
mechanisms are effective, they exclude permanent redistribution across Member States, and 
they provide an efficient remedy to institutional moral hazard in a broad but specific 
understanding of that concept, i.e. an understanding in which any redistribution across 
Member States is seen as the result of institutional moral hazard on one hand, and institutional 
moral hazard always leads to redistribution across Member States (in yet other words, ‘no 
institutional moral hazard’ and ‘no redistribution’ are interchangeable notions). Below, we 
will explain that the concept of institutional moral hazard that is relevant in the countries 
which we examined is different from such an understanding, because those countries do not 
a priori exclude redistribution across their federated entities via UI (see point 4 and point 6 
below).         
2. An EUBS would interfere with very complex multi-tiered systems in European Member 
States, always characterised by interdependence between UI benefits, UI activation, SA 
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benefits and SA activation policies, often by the involvement of three levels of governments, 
and in some cases by important managerial delegation processes. The sheer complexity of this 
architecture, which adds to the complexity of UI benefit schemes as such (examined in Task 2B 
of the Consortium’s research project), constitutes an important challenge with regard to the 
idea of an EUBS, which has to be addressed.  
3. Moral hazard in UI systems must be weighed against their stabilisation (and redistributive) 
capacities. The same holds for institutional moral hazard, associated with certain multi-tiered 
systems: if the stabilisation capacity of systems is enhanced by risk pooling at a higher level, 
but part of the unemployment regulation remains at the lower level (for instance with regard 
to activation), this division of labour inevitably implies institutional moral hazard. In other 
words, institutional moral hazard is ‘a price to pay’ to obtain better risk pooling and 
stabilisation.    
If institutional moral hazard is a price to pay, the objective is to mitigate the trade-off between 
stabilisation capacity and institutional moral hazard; in other words, for desirable levels of 
(enhanced) stabilisation capacity, institutional moral should be minimised. 
4. In all the countries under review, UI leads to a redistribution across the federated entities 
constituting the nation. In order to assess the extent of redistribution, one would need a 
detailed analysis, with regard to both the interpersonal redistributive capacity of UI and the 
regional and/or local incidence of unemployment. Data and time limitations did not allow for 
such an analysis in this study. On the basis of the data we have, it seems fair to say that this 
redistributive aspect is least important in the US case, whilst it is very important in the Belgian 
case; but there is no country in which redistribution across states, regions, provinces or local 
municipalities via a federal or central UI benefit system is excluded a priori.  
5. In our country case studies, we see institutional moral hazard with regard to UI benefits 
predominantly in relation to (i) poor activation policies and (ii) the shifting of SA caseload to 
UI caseload; obviously, poor economic, industrial and education policies that generate low 
employment rates are also a matter of concern in this context. Next to these mechanisms, 
institutional moral hazard in a ‘genuine EUBS’ may take yet another form, given the specific 
design of some of the proposals under examination in the Consortium’s research project 
(notably the ‘top-up’ proposal): EU Member States might reduce their effort with regard to UI 
benefits, by decreasing their generosity or coverage, at the expense of the EU.  
6. It seems that minimum requirements, with regard to both the quality of Member States’ UI and SA 
activation and the quality of Member States’ UI benefit systems, would be the best strategy to fight 
these different forms of institutional moral hazard arising in the context of an EUBS, next to 
financial mechanisms that eliminate the possibility for any country to be, on average, a net 
beneficiary of the scheme. First, any sustainable system of EUBS presupposes minimum 
requirements with regard to the quality of activation. Secondly, some variants of the EUBS 
proposal require, in addition, minimum requirements with regard to the generosity and coverage 
(i.e. the strictness of eligibility) of UI benefits. The latter statement should be understood well: 
minimum requirements with regard to the quality of the national UI benefit system may be 
desirable in any EUBS scheme, as a political quid pro quo and in order to improve the 
stabilisation capacity of national UI benefit systems; that is, the organisation of an EUBS may 
be a lever to demand improvements in national UI benefit systems, to boost their stabilisation 
potential. However, from the vantage point of institutional moral hazard, sensu stricto, the need 
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for minimum requirements with regard to the benefit systems seems to be strongest in the 
‘genuine EUBS’, and notably in the ‘top-up’ variant.21   
Other strategies against institutional moral hazard applied within nation states (centralisation 
of benefit systems and/or activation policies, financial incentives built into reimbursement 
models) seem either too complex or to go too much against the grain of sound EU subsidiarity 
principles. Financial mechanisms that allow some redistribution (for instance, because they 
want to take into account adverse historic circumstances with which certain regions have to 
cope), but nevertheless aim to prevent institutional moral hazard, are inevitably complex. 
They are complex because they must seek to disentangle ‘adverse circumstances’ and ‘poor 
quality of policies’ at lower levels of government. Hence, they are much more complex than 
financial mechanisms that simply aim to eliminate redistribution, whatever the root causes.  
In terms of governance, minimum requirements can also be administratively complex, and 
some of the cases in our survey suggest the existence of a trade-off between the rigidity of 
minimum requirements and/or control systems imposed by the central level and the 
necessary flexibility for effective policies at the decentralised level.  
European minimum requirements would impose convergence in unemployment regulation 
across EU Member States. Pursuing convergence in social policies is a well-known challenge 
in the EU, certainly with regard to activation: the European Employment Strategy (EES) and, 
more generally, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) have been testing grounds with 
regard to the potential of so-called ‘soft law’ in this domain. Much literature exists on the 
results of the EES and the OMC, showing mixed results. An effective soft convergence process 
with regard to the quality of activation (the Youth Guarantee might be an example) and with 
regard to the quality of unemployment benefits (not existing today but mentioned, in very 
generic terms, in the Five Presidents’ Report on the future of EMU)22 might be seen as a first 
step towards the establishment of such minimum requirements.  
7. We should distinguish moral hazard as an objective reality, i.e. an empirical observation 
with regard to the possibility for the insured to influence the liability of the insurer in a context 
of asymmetric information, from the public perception that moral hazard is present, and from 
public concern for moral hazard: these are three different things. It may be the case that there 
is more concern for moral hazard than reality warrants, and vice versa. In this respect, both a 
gap between perception and reality, and different degrees of public sensitivity with regard to 
the trade-off between moral hazard (as perceived) and the social and economic objectives of 
collective insurance (social cohesion, economic stabilisation) can play a role. We study a 
domain where opinions on matters of social justice, a priori beliefs about human behaviour and 
the choice of economic paradigm are very important. Apart from the fact that the trade-off 
between moral hazard and cohesion and stabilisation constitutes a normative problem par 
excellence, there is less hard empirical science in this domain than one might wish, a fortiori 
when the issue at hand is not only individual behaviour but the interaction of collective actors 
and political authorities, as is the case with institutional moral hazard. This is not to say that 
‘perception’ and ‘concern’ are unimportant; they are as much facts of political life and 
policymaking as is the objective architecture of an insurance policy. But an exaggerated 
perception of moral hazard can result in policies that are suboptimal and difficult to change. 
                                                   
21 Cf. section 1 for the discussion on the different contexts and policy goals of minimum requirements. 
22 Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, Report by J.-Cl. Juncker, in close cooperation with 
D. Tusk, J. Dijsselbloem, M. Draghi & M. Schultz, June 2015. 
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In other words, political culture (and its path dependency) is crucial. The US and the EU may 
today exemplify different equilibria in their public opinion: Europeans are probably less ready 
to reinsure their relatively generous national unemployment benefit systems at the EU level, 
compared to Americans, who accept a degree of federal reinsurance of relatively ungenerous 
state unemployment benefit systems. 
This means that the idea of an eventual EUBS cannot be dissociated from the broader challenge 
to enhance mutual trust among EU Member States in the overall quality of their national social 
fabric (Vandenbroucke, 2015). 
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Appendix: country fiches 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Germany 
Switzerland 
US  
 
We first present the analytical grid; then in one or two paragraphs, in italics, we summarise the 
case, focusing on what makes it distinctive. Next follows a short explanation. An extensive 
analysis of each case is provided in a separate annex to the Consortium’s report. 
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Country fiche Australia 
 
List of Abbreviations 
BMA – Bilateral Management Agreement 
CES – Commonwealth Employment Service 
DE – Department of Employment  
DHS – Department of Human Services 
JSA – Job Services Australia 
KPI – Key Performance Indicators 
KPM – Key Performance Measures 
NSA – Newstart Allowance 
JS – Job Search Allowance 
SA – Social Assistance 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
Table 2. Analytical grid Australia  
  Unemployment benefits (NSA) Activation of individuals with 
unemployment benefits (NSA) 
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
No decentralisation 
 
The federal level (DE) regulates and 
sets goals. 
No decentralisation 
 
The federal level (DE) regulates and 
sets goals. 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
Very limited delegation to Centrelink; 
no decentralisation  
 
Implementation is done by Centrelink, 
which is part of the federal DHS. The 
DE and the DHS enter into bilateral 
agreements, which include the job 
description of Centrelink. 
Very limited delegation to Centrelink; 
low degree of decentralisation through 
privatisation 
 
Activation services are delivered by 
private agencies. These private 
agencies sign contracts with the DE 
and receive their assignments from 
Centrelink. 
 
The contracts with the DE include a 
Code of Practice and Communication 
Protocols. The federal government has 
legislated detailed standardised work 
processes (a ‘service continuum’), a 
classification tool and a performance 
management system. 
3 Budgetary responsibility Federal 
 
Benefits are financed out of general 
government revenue. 
Federal 
 
Activation is financed out of general 
government revenue. Payments to the 
private service providers are based on 
outcomes they achieved. 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
n.a. 
 
The system is completely financed at 
the federal level. 
n.a. 
 
The system is completely financed at 
the federal level. 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
Yes Yes 
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capita basis)  
Caseload size varies structurally 
across states. 
 
Caseload size varies structurally 
across states. 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
Delegation to Centrelink Delegation to Centrelink, managerial 
decentralisation through private 
agencies 
 
 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
The BMA between the DE and the 
DHS/Centrelink includes input and 
output indicators. 
Private agencies are subject to the ‘Star 
Rating’ performance review. This 
system includes mostly outcome-
based indicators. 
 
For the DE-DHS relationship, there are 
input- and output-based KPM and five 
desired outcome indicators.  
The DE itself monitors ten outcome-
based KPI.  
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
No, 
 
The BMA governs the interaction 
between the DE and the 
DHS/Centrelink, but this is a bilateral 
agreement between two federal actors. 
Yes, 
 
An elaborate service continuum 
details the actions that must be taken 
at initial contact as well as at six other 
intervals for three so-called ‘streams’. 
Clients are to be classified by the 
agencies according to federal 
classification tools. This classification 
determines in which stream a client 
belongs. Within these streams, there 
are different services to be provided 
for clients under 30. 
Furthermore, a federal Code of 
Conduct and a Communication 
Protocol constitute additional 
minimum requirements. 
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
No For private agencies: yes, reduction of 
the amount of fees when clients 
require more time to be activated. 
Furthermore, poor performance affects 
‘Star Rating’ and therefore affects the 
possibility to attract clients and gain 
new contracts. 
 
For the DE-DHS relationship: no 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
n.a. 
 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
Yes, principal-agent issues exist w.r.t. activation and are recognised as such. 
 
There has been extensive experimentation with policies to control principal-
agent issues ever since activation was privatised. Principal-agent issues with 
private agencies are addressed through a detailed ‘service continuum’, through 
payments which are contingent on outcome-based indicators, through the 
introduction of a single IT-system, through mandatory individual action plans 
50 | VANDENBROUCKE & LUIGJES 
 
for clients and through the ‘Star Rating’ performance management system. 
Principal-agent issues between the DE and the DHS/Centrelink are addressed 
through the BMAs and the included performance measurement. 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
The Australian case is not available in Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
The Australian system is characterised by the privatisation of the activation of the only major 
unemployment-related benefit – Newstart Allowance (NSA). The Australian regulation of 
unemployment includes four prominent actors: the Department of Employment (DE), the Department 
of Human Services (DHS), a federal PES called Centrelink (which is currently officially part of the 
DHS) and private agencies for activation. The Australian experience has been marked by persistent 
efforts to tackle principal-agent issues. Essentially, the Australian government moved from a ‘black box’ 
approach to more and more prescription, monitoring and control. The Australian experience suggests a 
trade-off between the need for control on one hand, and the need for flexibility in activation processes on 
the other hand. 
The federal level is responsible for legislating and financing NSA and activation. However, 
within the federal government responsibilities are divided between the DE and 
DHS/Centrelink. The DE regulates the labour market and benefits and also sets policy goals 
– most prominently with regard to the NSA. The NSA is the only major unemployment-related 
benefit and therefore acts as the benefit of last resort.23 Centrelink is responsible for the 
administration of benefits and, furthermore, for communicating with the private agencies that 
deliver activation services. Despite this responsibility of Centrelink, the private agencies enter 
into formal contracts with the DE. In other words, the DE has delegated the supervision of 
agencies to Centrelink but retains the responsibility for granting contracts and fees to those 
same agencies. 
Faltering employment performance in the mid-1980s and 1990s increased the importance of 
activation policies. In the mid-1990s, the Australian government first started experimenting 
with privatisation of activation. For-profit and community service providers were used as 
competition for the federal PES (then called Commonwealth Employment Services or CES). 
Subsequent reforms (in the 1990s) replaced CES with Centrelink, which was then still an 
independent at-arm’s-length agency (later, it was incorporated into the DHS, cf. infra). 
Centrelink had fewer responsibilities than CES (the responsibilities of CES were mostly 
administrative but it also provided some basic services) and more prominence was given to 
the private agencies. Full privatisation was implemented in 1998, when the federal 
government introduced Job Network, a system in which almost 300 private agencies would 
have broad flexibility to implement services. 
The private agencies were contracted through tendering processes based on three levels of 
service intensity. The first of these tendering rounds did not yet include many minimum 
requirements or much supervision; the private agencies were relatively free to adopt their own 
strategies. Agencies were paid through commencement fees and outcome-based payments 
                                                   
23 The NSA is subject to both an income test and an asset test; cf. the information provided by the DHS 
website (www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/newstart-allowance); see also 
Davidson & Whiteford, 2011, pp. 13-14 for an academic source. 
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which were differentiated per service intensity level. Subsequent tendering rounds included 
increasingly strict minimum requirements, stricter use of a federal classification tool and more 
conditionality tied to payments. In short, the Australian government started to move from a 
‘black box’ approach towards a prescribed continuum of services under which providers were 
paid to undertake regular interviews with each jobseeker. Included in these reforms was the 
expansion of the ‘Star Rating’ performance management system. This system measured the 
performance of agencies based on outcome indicators. These agencies’ rating determined their 
eligibility for a new contract with the DE. 
The aforementioned reforms were a reaction to the concern that private agencies were 
‘parking’ (e.g. placing clients in programmes that had little substance) hard-to-place clients. 
The incentive to do so stemmed from the funding method and the lack of minimum 
requirements. The private agencies were enticed to take in harder-to-place clients with 
commencement fees. Agencies focused on attaining the outcome-based payments for easier-
to-place clients and were satisfied with just the commencement fees for the higher intensity 
levels. Another major overhaul followed these reforms in 2007: the introduction of Job Services 
Australia. This network combined several labour market programmes. It also addressed 
continued concern for parking of clients, by making the agencies responsible for a jobseeker 
for the full duration of benefit dependency as well as by removing the option to specialise in 
certain intensity levels. Furthermore, an even more complicated and stricter service continuum 
introduced a mandatory individual Employment Pathway Plan. The mandatory use of a single 
IT system for all service providers further limited the private agencies. This IT system 
simplified, but also standardised, the federal monitoring of and communication with the 
private agencies. 
The relationship between the federal level and the private agencies is characterised by a 
persistent concern for principal-agent problems and a trade-off between addressing these 
problems by more federal control on one hand, and flexibility and efficient activation on the 
other hand. 
The relationship between the DE and Centrelink is also characterised by principal-agent 
issues, although in a different way. As a successor to CES, Centrelink has considerably fewer 
responsibilities than CES. The relationship was governed by a partnership agreement. In 2011, 
Centrelink was incorporated into the DHS – this entailed the DHS becoming formally 
responsible for the administration of benefits, even though Centrelink still performs these 
duties. The DE and the DHS/Centrelink enter into Bilateral Management Agreements (BMAs). 
These agreements outline possible risks concerning their cooperation and includes mutually 
agreed upon Key Performance Measures (KPMs). Furthermore, the DE monitors its own set 
of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which also include the effectiveness and timeliness of 
administration and disbursement. These KPIs and KPMs do not align. Nonetheless, the BMAs 
are an attempt to address principal-agent issues that arise from the delegation of 
responsibilities by the DE to DHS/Centrelink. 
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Country fiche Austria 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AMS – Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich (federal PES) 
AIVG – Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz (Unemployment Insurance Act) 
BMS – Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (Social Assistance) 
PES – Public Employment Services 
SA – Social Assistance 
UA – Unemployment Assistance 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
Table 3. Analytical grid Austria 
  Unemployment 
benefits and 
employment 
assistance 
(AVIG) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment 
benefits and 
employment 
assistance 
Unemployment-
related SA 
(BMS) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
SA benefits  
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
No 
decentralisation 
Delegation to the 
AMS; low 
decentralisation 
 
Formal regulation 
is completely 
federal. 
 
Policy goals set by 
the federal 
ministry and 
internally 
transposed by the 
AMS (but social 
partners play a 
large role) 
De facto low 
decentralisation 
 
Federal level of 
government has 
laid down 
requirements 
and policy goals 
(through an 
agreement with 
the Länder).  
 
Delegation to the 
AMS; low 
decentralisation 
 
Formal regulation 
is completely 
federal. 
 
Policy goals set by 
the federal 
ministry and 
internally 
transposed by the 
AMS (but social 
partners play a 
large role) 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
No 
decentralisation 
 
The AMS 
implements and 
administers the 
disbursement of 
benefits but has 
no policy 
autonomy 
(hence, no 
delegation). 
Delegated to the 
AMS; medium 
decentralisation 
 
The federal 
government has 
created 
standardised work 
processes and 
minimum 
requirements, but 
local AMS offices 
have significant 
leeway. 
 
Medium 
decentralisation 
 
Länder are 
bound by 
minimum 
requirements 
but are still 
solely 
responsible for 
implementation. 
Delegation to the 
AMS; medium 
decentralisation 
 
The federal 
government has 
created 
standardised 
work processes 
and minimum 
requirements, but 
local AMS offices 
have significant 
leeway. 
3 Budgetary responsibility Federal 
 
Funded by 
employer-
employee 
contribution 
Federal 
 
Funded by 
employer-
employee 
contribution 
Länder and 
municipalities 
 
Länder are the 
primary 
responsible 
actors; in 
practice, the 
Federal 
 
Funded by 
employer-
employee 
contribution 
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municipalities 
often contribute 
50% of the costs. 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
n.a. n.a. n.a. w.r.t. the 
Länder-federal 
relationship, but 
the Länder can 
request financial 
contributions 
from the 
municipalities 
towards the cost 
of SA.   
n.a. 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Unemployment 
rates of the 
Länder differ 
structurally. 
Yes 
 
Unemployment 
rates of the Länder 
differ structurally. 
n.a. Yes 
 
Unemployment 
rates of the Länder 
differ structurally. 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
n.a. 
 
Delegation, with 
managerial 
decentralisation to 
the AMS 
 
The AMS is an 
agent of the 
federal level. 
Political Delegation, with 
managerial 
decentralisation to 
the AMS 
 
The AMS is an 
agent of the 
federal level. 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
n.a. Two sets of 
performance 
indicators 
 
Balanced 
scorecard: input, 
output and quality 
measures 
 
Annual objectives: 
outcome and 
quality measures 
None Two sets of 
performance 
indicators 
 
Balanced 
scorecard: input, 
output and 
quality measures 
 
Annual objectives: 
outcome and 
quality measures 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
n.a. 
 
The legislation 
concerning UI 
and the 
implementation 
thereof is tightly 
regulated at the 
federal level. 
Yes 
 
Fixed time limit 
for first job offer 
(extra rules for 
young clients); job 
centres must 
engage in a 
personal action 
plan with their 
clients; 
standardised work 
practices 
concerning 
differentiation in 
intensity levels for 
different types of 
clients 
Yes  
 
The agreement 
between the 
Länder and the 
federal level 
stipulates a 
minimum 
subsistence 
level, mandatory 
top-ups and in-
kind benefits, 
mandatory 
activation by the 
AMS and means 
and asset tests. 
Yes 
 
Fixed time limit 
for first job offer 
(extra rules for 
young clients); job 
centres must 
engage in a 
personal action 
plan with their 
clients; 
standardised 
work practices 
concerning 
differentiation in 
intensity levels for 
different types of 
clients 
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9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
n.a. Yes 
 
Shadow of 
hierarchy: in the 
case of bad 
performance, first 
a self-evaluation 
and otherwise 
directions from a 
higher AMS level 
will follow. 
n.a. Yes 
 
Shadow of 
hierarchy: in the 
case of bad 
performance, first 
a self-evaluation 
and otherwise 
directions from a 
higher AMS level 
will follow. 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
n.a. 
 
There is no political decentralisation. 
Hence, there is no institutional moral 
hazard. 
The responses in the past have 
eliminated most opportunities for 
institutional moral hazard: the AMS 
implements activation, and loopholes 
for dumping have been closed off. 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
Yes 
 
The principal-agent issues relating to 
the AMS’s responsibility for activation 
are recognised and addressed by two 
systems of performance measurement 
and a strong role for the social 
partners in the governance of the AMS 
(who act as a check on possibly 
perverse incentives in the AMS). 
Yes 
 
W.r.t. the AMS: cf. row 11 in the 
columns on UI 
 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
The Austrian case is not available in Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
The three most important actors in the Austrian regulation of unemployment are the federal (but semi-
autonomous) PES (Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich or AMS), the federal government itself and the 
regions (Länder). Austria is interesting because it faces similar problems as Germany and Switzerland 
but chose a different response. Confronted by a dichotomy between SA activation and UI activation and 
disparities between the employment performance of the Länder, the Austrian federal government opted 
for a harmonisation of UI activation and SA activation and a (de facto) harmonisation of SA benefits 
but did not centralise SA as Germany did. Austria is characterised by a uniform activation regime for 
SA and UI, even though the benefits are (in part) regulated and financed by different levels of 
government. The Länder remain responsible for SA but with considerably less flexibility than before. 
The Austrian federal government is responsible for the legislation on UI and UA, the collection 
of the social contributions that finance these benefit schemes and activation thereof. The AMS 
is a semi-autonomous federal institution with its headquarters in Vienna, nine regional offices 
in the Länder and 99 local offices. The AMS administrates and disburses the benefits and is 
responsible for both UI activation and SA activation.24 The AMS itself is also financed by social 
contributions. The Länder are responsible for the legislation and financing of SA. However, in 
2010 the federal government made an agreement with the Länder concerning minimum 
requirements for SA benefits. The Länder adopted this agreement in their legislation and can 
                                                   
24 In practice, many of the services for the caseloads are provided by private agencies. 
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expand or supplement the minimum requirements as they see fit. Often, the Länder request 
the municipalities to contribute half of the SA costs. In Austria, the relevance of SA is relatively 
limited because UA is (potentially) a benefit scheme of unlimited duration. Unemployed 
persons who exhaust UI can try to claim UA, which limits the interaction between UI and SA 
due to UI-exhaustion. 
Nonetheless, as in Germany and Switzerland, rising unemployment and SA caseloads 
(starting in the 1990s) increased the (political) salience of internal disparities. During the two 
previous decades, there was a growing disparity between the activation of UI/UA and SA and 
there were disparities between the employment performance and the activation efforts of the 
Länder. The AMS was reformed in 1994 from a federal ministerial department to its current 
semi-autonomous form. In principle, it served both the UI/UA and the SA caseload. However, 
the Länder were still officially responsible for activation of SA. Through territorial pacts with 
the federal government (and the AMS), the Länder could refer their caseloads to the AMS job 
centres or arrange activation themselves through local social welfare offices. The option to 
refer SA clients to the AMS was neither standardised nor systematically implemented.  
The Länder were not just responsible for SA activation, but also for regulating and financing 
SA benefits. This generated regional differences in the setup of SA. Combined with the 
differences in activation and the unsystematic referral of clients to the AMS, regionally 
heterogeneous unemployment rates created large differences between the Länder. These were 
addressed by the 2010 agreement on a nationwide means-tested minimum income security 
between the federal government and the Länder. The agreement laid down minimum 
requirements for SA which the regions then had to adopt in their legislation but could also 
expand upon and supplement. In practice, however, the agreement had a centralising and 
harmonising effect. Furthermore, it standardised the referral process for SA clients to the AMS. 
Contrary to what happened in Germany, the PES offices were not merged with local social 
welfare offices. The AMS took over responsibility for SA activation completely and the SA 
caseload was granted the same rights and treatment as the UI caseload. Through this complete 
harmonisation of activation, the agreement also closed off any possible routes for the dumping 
of SA caseloads on UI through programmes that renew UI eligibility. The local welfare offices 
remain responsible for assessing the work capacity of SA claimants. The Länder and 
municipalities have the incentive to send as many able-bodied SA claimants to the AMS as 
possible since the federal level finances activation. 
Therefore, there are no clear possibilities left for institutional moral hazard in the Austrian 
regulation of unemployment. What is left is the prominence of the AMS and its crucial role in 
activation. The relationship between the federal government and the AMS raises principal-
agent issues. These have been addressed in three different ways. Firstly, the AMS board of 
directors is supervised by a legislative body that consists of both social partners (who are in 
the majority) and the government. Secondly, this legislative body sets out quantitative annual 
objectives for the AMS as a whole, which the board of directors translates into a ‘balanced 
scorecard’ for all the local and regional offices. Thus there are two different performance 
measurement systems: one concerning the performance of the AMS as a whole (the annual 
objectives) and one that includes the performance of the local and regional branches (balanced 
scorecard). Finally, the federal government has legislated a system of minimum requirements 
which determines standardised work processes and the timing of the first interview. The 
standardised work processes differentiate between three broad types of services in job centres, 
with varying intensity. The jobseekers are categorised according to their needs and assigned 
to the appropriate type. The AMS itself is responsible for the assessment of clients but some 
federal minimum requirements apply – such as the mandatory referral to the most intensive 
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type for jobseekers who are unemployed for over three months. The combination of a 
legislative body that supervises the AMS management, the regulation concerning 
standardised work processes, and the performance management systems in place limit the 
principal-agent problems. 
The Austrian regulation of unemployment was confronted with similar issues as the German 
and Swiss cases: heterogeneity in the employment performance and activation efforts in its 
constituent units, disparities in the regulation of different caseloads, and possibilities for 
institutional moral hazard through the interaction of benefits provided by different levels of 
government. Contrary to Switzerland, Austria opted for more central control, but, contrary to 
Germany, it did not completely take over regulation of SA and it did not merge job centres 
with local social welfare offices. The result is a fully harmonised activation system, one that 
leaves the Länder with the responsibility for SA but with considerably less flexibility than 
before.  
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Country fiche Belgium 
 
List of Abbreviations 
OCMW – Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn  (municipal social centre, responsible for SA) 
CPAS – Centre Public d’Action Sociale (idem) 
PES – Public Employment Services 
SA – Social Assistance 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
Table 4. Analytical grid Belgium 
  Unemployment 
benefits 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment 
benefits 
Unemployment-
related SA benefits  
Activation of 
individuals with SA 
benefits  
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility 
on lower level) w.r.t. 
design of the policy: 
- Formal 
regulation 
- Policy goals 
No decentralisation Total 
decentralisation 
(since Sixth State 
Reform)  
 
Before Sixth State 
Reform: regions, but 
constrained by 
Cooperation 
agreement with 
federal level w.r.t. 
process 
organisation; since 
Sixth State Reform: 
regions completely 
responsible 
(sanctioning is also 
completely 
regionalised, but on 
the basis of federal 
unemployment 
regulation and 
federal normative 
framework) 
No decentralisation No decentralisation, 
but policy goals are 
formulated in a very 
generic and non-
binding way in the 
federal legislation 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility 
on lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of 
the policy  
No decentralisation  
 
Payment of benefits 
is done by payment 
bodies (one public 
fund and three 
auxiliary funds 
linked to national 
trade union 
federations), but 
they don’t have 
policy autonomy 
w.r.t. UI benefits. 
Total 
decentralisation 
(since Sixth State 
Reform)  
 
Before Sixth State 
Reform: regions, but 
constrained by 
Cooperation 
agreement with 
federal level w.r.t. 
administrative 
process 
organisation; since 
Sixth State Reform: 
regions completely 
responsible 
Total 
decentralisation  
 
Benefits are 
administered by 
OCMW/CPAS. 
Total 
decentralisation 
(since Sixth State 
Reform) 
3 Budgetary 
responsibility 
Federal level   
 
Federal social 
security 
Regional level (since 
Sixth State Reform) 
 
Before Sixth State 
Central and 
municipal level  
Municipalities and 
(since Sixth State 
Reform) regional 
level 
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Reform: federal 
lump sum subsidy 
supports regional 
budgets 
 
Before Sixth State 
Reform: federal level 
supports municipal 
budgets with some 
extra funding for 
‘leefloners’ who are 
activated 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
n.a. n.a. (since Sixth 
State Reform) 
 
Before Sixth State 
Reform: federal 
lump sum subsidy 
supports regional 
budgets 
Yes 
 
Federal state 
reimburses part of 
SA benefit cost for 
municipalities 
n.a. (since Sixth 
State Reform) 
 
Before Sixth State 
Reform: federal level 
supports regional 
budgets with some 
extra funding for 
‘leefloners’ who are 
activated 
5 Structural 
redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Important structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
n.a. Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads, both 
across regions and 
across 
municipalities 
n.a. 
6 Political or 
managerial 
decentralisation/del
egation? 
Political  Political 
 
Regions 
Political 
 
Municipalities 
Political 
 
Regions/municipalit
ies 
7 Indicators used in 
the monitoring of 
lower-level 
performance by 
higher level (on the 
basis of: input, 
output and 
outcome)? 
n.a. Before Sixth State 
Reform:  
compliance with 
Cooperation 
agreement is 
monitored, but no 
monitoring of 
regional 
performance 
No Before Sixth State 
Reform: monitoring 
by federal level on 
the basis of input 
steering, but 
inconsequential; 
since Sixth State 
Reform: whether or 
not there will be 
more steering and 
less policy discretion 
by the regions is as 
yet unclear. 
8 Is a system of 
‘minimum 
requirements’ 
applied? 
n.a. Before Sixth State 
Reform: 
Cooperation 
Agreement can be 
seen as a 
(negotiated) system 
of minimum 
requirements 
Since Sixth State 
Reform: a new 
system of minimum 
requirements has 
been negotiated and 
will be embedded in 
federal legislation 
n.a. n.a. 
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9 Are performance-
based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the 
higher level at the 
lower level? 
n.a. No n.a. No 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-
7: perception of, 
concern about, and 
approach to 
problems of 
institutional moral 
hazard? 
Yes  
 
Before Sixth State Reform: Cooperation 
agreements of 2004 and 2013 
Since Sixth State Reform: it is unclear 
whether the new architecture (which gives 
more room for manoeuvre to regions w.r.t. 
activation but within a new system of 
minimum requirements) will be seen as 
creating more or less institutional moral 
hazard 
Until now, no public debate on institutional 
moral hazard in this domain 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-
7: approach to 
principal-agent 
issues? 
n.a. (principal-agent problems might be discussed in the context of the relationships between 
the regional governments and their PES, but we do not include these in the analysis of the 
Belgian case) 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system  
Important (Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a.) 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
Since the 1980s, Belgium has featured a specific division of labour in UI: the federal government has 
been responsible for UI benefits while the regions have been responsible for the PES and UI activation; 
however, the regions have not been responsible for monitoring the search effort of unemployed 
individuals (job search is a condition to be eligible for UI benefits, laid down in the federal legislation). 
By the beginning of the 2000s, this division of labour came to be seen as a root cause of institutional 
moral hazard. Institutional moral hazard was tackled by a detailed Cooperation Agreement between the 
federal and the regional level with regard to activation policies in 2004, which can be seen as a negotiated 
system of ‘minimum requirements’. From 2015 onwards, the Sixth State Reform pushes the existing 
logic of devolution even further, by giving the regions full competence in the domain of UI and SA 
activation, including notably the monitoring of search efforts. Simultaneously, federal and regional 
authorities agreed on a common ‘normative framework’ for monitoring the unemployed, to ensure that 
the principles of the federal UI are not undermined. This means that a new form of ‘minimum 
requirements’ will be introduced but on a different institutional basis. 
Historically, SA (the so-called ‘leefloon’/’revenue d’intégration sociale’) plays a residual role in Belgium; 
in terms of budgets and caseload, compared to UI it is relatively marginal. The legislation with regard 
to SA benefits and the basic principles of SA activation is federal, but the implementation is completely 
devolved to the municipal level. The budgetary responsibility for SA benefits hinges on a 50/50 division 
between the federal government and municipalities, with some variation (depending, for instance, on 
their activation efforts, before the Sixth State Reform). The Sixth State Reform transfers the regulatory 
competence with regard to SA activation from the federal to the regional level.  
In short, before the Sixth State Reform, concern for institutional moral hazard in UI became prominent, 
and was tackled by the intergovernmental negotiation of a detailed system of minimum requirements 
with regard to UI activation. The Sixth State Reform promises increased autonomy to the regions with 
regard to activation of both UI and SA, but UI activation is subject to a new system of minimum 
requirements. How this new constellation will work out is as yet unclear. 
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With regard to activation, Belgium has been a laggard. The actual shift from passive labour 
market policies to active labour market policies occurred very late. A systematic approach to 
activation, conforming to the 1997 guidelines of the European Employment Strategy, was only 
implemented from 2004 onwards. Before 2004, there was no systematic ‘preventative’ attempt 
to activate new entrants into unemployment across all Belgian regions; and the ‘curative’ 
approach (activating the stock of long-term unemployed) was also very disparate. By that 
time, the existing federal/regional division of labour had created considerable political 
tensions with regard to the governance of the unemployment system.  
The Employment Conference of September 2003 paved the way for a policy change. The basic 
principles were laid down in the Cooperation Agreement of 30 April 2004. The goal was to 
better coordinate the instruments of the regional authorities (counselling and training) with 
the responsibility of the federal authorities to control the labour market availability of 
unemployed benefit recipients. The rights and obligations of the unemployed had to be 
rebalanced. Regions would intensify their activation efforts and the federal level would 
provide a financial contribution to contribute to the development of activation services. 
The Cooperation Agreement can be interpreted as a negotiated, detailed system of ‘minimum 
requirements’. It resulted in a marked convergence, across the three regions, with regard to 
the way activation was organised. The Cooperation Agreement not only fuelled activation and 
training efforts in all regions, but also corrected a situation that was politically unsustainable, 
namely the interregional imbalance with regard to sanctions as it existed in the beginning of 
the 2000s. That regional imbalance may be seen as a signal of ‘institutional moral hazard’ 
which undermined the legitimacy of the system. The agreement and the mutual regional and 
federal commitments attached to it created a strong incentive for the regional PES to step up 
their activation effort, but it was also perceived as a rather rigid straitjacket for the PES, with 
insufficient leeway to accommodate interregional differences in the caseload. This inspired the 
call for more regional political autonomy in the realm of activation, which was taken on board 
in a new round of constitutional reform, the Sixth State Reform (discussed from 2010 
onwards). 
In 2013, a new Cooperation Agreement was negotiated, in the same vein as the 2004 
Agreement. This 2013 Cooperation Agreement will be the last agreement of this type in 
Belgium; from 2015 onwards, the institutional architecture changes in the context of the Sixth 
State Reform. The devolution of power under the Sixth State Reform includes UI activation, 
the monitoring of job search efforts (both the so-called ‘passive’ and ‘active’ availability of 
jobseekers), as well as sanctions related to this. However, UI legislation, including the 
normative framework defining the search efforts jobseekers must develop and the notion of 
‘suitable job offers’, the definition of administrative checks and sanctions in particular, remain 
federal competences. The Sixth State Reform gives regions the full spending authority over 
previously earmarked funds (for activation) that were transferred to them in the context of the 
Cooperation Agreement. The regions will be able to spend the budget as they see fit for various 
forms of labour market policy in a broad sense. 
In the context of this paper, the Belgian experience before 2004 can be interpreted as an 
archetypal case of institutional moral hazard: regional authorities were under no financial 
pressure to commit themselves to systematic activation, given the fact that the funding of UI 
benefits was federal. This changed radically with the ‘minimum requirements’ on activation, 
laid down in the intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement of 2004. Politically, the basic idea 
was that regional authorities and PES accepted that they had to contribute actively to the 
budgetary viability and public legitimacy of the federal unemployment benefit system. 
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In a sense, the 2004 Cooperation Agreement can be seen as a second-best solution to the 
problem the Belgian labour market was struggling with since the 1980s: the institutional 
separation between, on the one hand, control over the legality of unemployment benefits, 
which remained a federal competence, and, on the other hand, assistance to jobseekers, which 
had become a regional responsibility. The cooperation agreement marked a turning point, but 
it might be argued that the best solution is to combine control and guidance at a single level 
of government.  
The Sixth State Reform has taken the call for further devolvement of activation policy on board, 
but it did not contain a specific approach to the institutional moral hazard associated with the 
ensuing division of labour. For instance, no specific intergovernmental ‘financial incentive’ 
mechanism was attached to the further devolution of powers in the domain of activation, 
which, prima facie, increases the potential for institutional moral hazard in the Belgian system. 
The Sixth State Reform has been voted in parliament, and the implementation is only starting 
now. In 2015, federal and regional authorities agreed on a common ‘normative framework’ for 
monitoring the unemployed, to ensure that the principles of the federal UI are not 
undermined. This agreement, which sets out the policies with regard to monitoring and 
sanctioning in detail, will be given a legal basis in a royal decree. This means that a new form 
of ‘minimum requirements’ will be introduced, but on a different institutional basis. 
Paradoxically, the Sixth State Reform may well entail as much, or even more, 
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination. If successful, this could lead to a form of 
‘joint decision and shared implementation federalism’, in which the federal government, social 
partners and regions shape policy together. The jury is still out with regard to the impact of 
this new constellation. 
With regard to SA activation, the decentralisation to the local level in the past was not 
accompanied by stricter federal steering or monitoring (as is the case in Denmark). The federal 
government has little information about the way municipalities use their large autonomy in 
SA activation. In the context of the new constitutional reform, the competence for SA activation 
will be devolved to the regions. Whether or not this will lead to a more consequential central 
steering (by the regions) and less policy discretion at the municipal level is as yet unclear. 
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Country fiche Canada25 
 
List of Abbreviations 
CST – Canada Social Transfer 
EI – Employment Insurance 
EIA – Employment Insurance Act 
LMA – Labour Market Agreement 
LMDA – Labour Market Development Agreement 
P/T governments – Provincial/Territorial governments 
SA – Social Assistance 
Table 5. Analytical grid Canada. 
  Unemployment 
benefits 
(Employment 
Insurance Act) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
employment 
insurance under 
LMDA regime 
(Employment 
Insurance Act) 
Unemployment-
related social 
assistance/ 
income support 
benefits  
Activation of 
individuals with 
social assistance 
benefits (SA 
recipients can be 
served under both 
the LMA and 
LMDA; however, 
they are not 
eligible for all 
LMDA-financed 
services) 
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
None 
 
Federal level 
determines 
regulation and 
policy goals. 
 
 
High 
decentralisation 
 
Federal level 
determines a 
broad list of 
programmes and 
negotiates targets 
with provinces. 
Provinces design 
their own policy in 
accordance with 
prescribed list and 
negotiate targets. 
Total 
decentralisation 
 
Provinces are 
free to design 
their own social 
assistance 
scheme and set 
their own goals. 
 
Under LMA 
regime: High 
decentralisation 
 
Provinces are free 
to design their 
own programmes 
and set their own 
targets. 
 
Under LMDA: cf. 
column on 
activation of 
unemployment 
benefits. 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
None Total 
decentralisation 
Total 
decentralisation 
Total 
decentralisation  
 
(both LMA and 
LMDA) 
3 Budgetary responsibility Federal  Federal Provincial 
With some 
federal 
contributions 
through CST 
(less than 10% of 
cost, i.e. 
marginal). 
Federal 
Both LMA and 
LMDA are federal 
transfers, with 
LMA being 
supplemented by 
some provincial 
contributions. 
                                                   
25 This describes the Canadian arrangement up to 2014, when all LMA Agreements (except in Quebec) 
were replaced by Canada Job Fund Agreements (JFAs). The JFAs reduced federal funding on activation 
for the unemployed to focus instead on people who were already working.   
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4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
n.a. 
 
Yes (but subject to 
review) 
LMDA 
Yes  
CST (but 
marginal) 
Yes  
Both LMA and 
LMDA are federal 
transfers, with 
LMA being 
subject to change 
at federal 
determination. 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
capita-basis) 
Yes 
Caseload size 
varies 
structurally 
across provinces 
Yes,  
As provinces with 
higher 
unemployment in 
1996 got more 
money. 
No 
Federal funds 
are distributed 
on the basis of a 
per capita 
formula. 
Under LMA 
regime: No 
Federal funds are 
distributed on the 
basis of a per 
capita formula. 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
n.a. Political Political Under LMA 
regime: Political 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
n.a. One each of input, 
output and 
outcome (crude) 
federal indicators, 
negotiated target 
levels. 
Other indicators 
may be agreed 
upon and P/T can 
set additional 
indicators/targets 
None Under LMA 
regime: Input, 
output and 
outcome. 
Indicators 
federally 
negotiated and 
targets 
provincially set. 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
n.a. No No (except for 
no-residency 
requirement) 
Under LMA 
regime: No 
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
n.a. No No Under LMA 
regime: No 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
In EI benefits: n.a. 
 
In the interaction between EI, SA and 
ALMPS: institutional moral hazard 
exists, but federal action remains 
limited. 
Reporting only on very crude 
indicators with no incentive structure 
and no system of minimum 
requirements. Due to the high level of 
decentralisation provinces can affect 
federal EI caseloads with little 
possibility for the federal level to 
influence their behaviour. The crude 
level of performance measurement 
creates an information asymmetry. 
Poor performance can result in a 
larger share of the funds allocated to a 
certain province due to the nature of 
the allocation formula. Federal action 
is inhibited by historical factors. 
Under LMA regime: n.a.  
 
The federal level only marginally 
contributes to the costs of SA and 
therefore cannot be seen as a true 
‘insurer’ of provincial risk. However, 
this is due to the transformation of 
CAP into CHST and later into the 
CST, which is the result of federal 
action to prevent moral hazard. 
 
Under LMDA regime: the possibility 
of shifting LMDA funding from 
intensive to less intensive services, 
which can be used to service SA 
recipients, can be seen as a form of 
institutional moral hazard; however, 
there is also no awareness regarding a 
specific response to it. 
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11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
n.a. (due to the political nature of 
decentralisation we do not apply p-a 
concept here). 
n.a. (due to the political nature of 
decentralisation we do not apply p-a 
concept here). 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
The Canadian case is not available in Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
Responsibilities in the Canadian labour market governance system are divided between the federal 
government and the provinces. Canada is characterised by a high level of decentralisation, federal-
provincial agreements concerning activation, and regional differences in the generosity of federally 
regulated Employment Insurance (EI) benefits. This architecture generates institutional moral hazard. 
However, currently, it seems institutional moral hazard is not perceived as a prominent problem. This 
is due to the historical development of Canadian federalism and the relatively low generosity of the 
unemployment-related benefit schemes (notably for unemployment of longer duration). However, 
institutional moral hazard played an important part in shaping Canada’s multi-tiered regulation of 
unemployment, most importantly in its system of SA. Canada, in this sense, is akin to the US, in which 
concern for institutional moral hazard plays a different and less obvious role than in the other countries 
we examine. 
The federal level is fully responsible for EI benefits and the provincial governments are the 
dominant actor in SA. Both EI activation and SA activation are governed by bilateral 
agreements between the federal government and each province. These bilateral agreements 
imply an almost total devolution of active labour market policies, with the exception of 
programmes for specific vulnerable groups (Aboriginal people and youth) that are still 
managed by the federal government. As a result, the interest of the provinces and the federal 
level diverge: it is in the interest of the provinces to activate the SA caseload but not necessarily 
the EI caseload.   
Institutional moral hazard in Canada stems from two sources. First, the provinces are 
responsible for the design and implementation of the activation of EI benefit recipients, with 
both the activation and the benefits financed by the federal level. Secondly, provinces can 
deliver services that are financed by bilateral agreements concerning EI, to their own SA 
caseloads. It is relatively easy for the provinces to deliver services to the (primarily provincially 
financed) SA caseload, since not all federally financed activation services are exclusively for 
EI recipients.  
The federal government provides no positive financial incentives for the provinces to activate 
EI recipients. Rather, the generosity of the federal EI scheme is dependent upon employment 
performance in the provinces; the higher the unemployment rate, the more generous the 
scheme. Secondly, the allocation formula for activation funds for EI is also, in part, contingent 
on the unemployment rate. In other words, to the extent that financial incentives exist, they do 
not stimulate effective activation but rather the opposite. Furthermore, there is no extensive 
federal system of minimum requirements for the activation of EI recipients. Finally, the 
performance measurement system to monitor the behaviour of provinces is rather crude and 
does not include an explicit comparison of provincial performance. 
Activation of the EI caseload is financed through bilateral agreements, called Labour Market 
Development Agreements (LMDAs). These include services that are reserved for EI 
beneficiaries, but they also include less intensive services which are open to other unemployed 
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persons as well. Until the mid-2000s, activation of SA, which was primarily financed by the 
provinces,26 had lagged behind that of the EI scheme. To rectify this (but also to compensate 
for the fact that federal ALMP funding for EI became increasingly inadequate), the federal 
government engaged in still other bilateral agreements (Labour Market Agreements or LMAs) 
which were open to everyone including SA recipients but excluding EI recipients. Provincial 
governments can use policies financed by LMDAs, as well as LMAs, to activate SA 
beneficiaries. This can be seen as a form of institutional moral hazard since federal EIA funds 
are used to activate the provincially financed unemployed. The federal government has 
implemented limited means to counter this development. 
Nevertheless, the Canadian federal government seems relatively unconcerned about 
institutional moral hazard regarding activation. Three factors may explain this relative lack of 
concern. First, the relatively low generosity and coverage of the Canadian EI system mitigates 
the budgetary impact of increased unemployment, making institutional moral hazard less of 
a pressing issue. Second, there has been limited attention to how federal activation funds are 
distributed between provinces. Third, the specific process of Canadian devolution may have 
limited the public and political perception of institutional moral hazard. Historically, 
provinces held competences concerning training and education. In addition, the provinces 
were already responsible for SA activation. The devolution of the activation of the EI caseload 
could be regarded as a merger of overlapping competences and streamlining of public 
administration. Furthermore, the strong desire for autonomy (and even independence) in 
some provinces – most notably in Quebec – made the federal government more open-minded 
about devolution.  
However, institutional moral hazard did play an important role in shaping SA. From the 1960s 
to 1996, SA was a shared-cost benefit. The federal level provided open-ended matching funds 
for provincial spending. This method of funding was abolished in 1996 in favour of a block 
grant funded system, much like in the US case. The block grant has since not increased in 
size,27 and as a consequence, it has shifted the budgetary burden towards the provinces. The 
change in funding method was a result of federal concerns over provinces being overly 
generous. In other words, funding methods changed due to concern over institutional moral 
hazard and resulted in a clear shift in budgetary responsibility. Therefore, to conclude that 
institutional moral hazard did not play a role in Canadian regulation of unemployment would 
be a mistake. Specific historical and institutional developments, combined with increasingly 
inadequate federal funding, weakened the Canadian federal government and thus made it 
incapable of taking action against institutional moral hazard. 
Country fiche Denmark 
 
List of Abbreviations 
SA – Social Assistance 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
 
                                                   
26 Currently, the provinces finance around 90% of the SA costs. 
27 However, it certainly did change: in the beginning both health spending, SA and social services were 
included in the same block grant; this was later disaggregated to health spending on one hand, and SA 
and social services on the other hand. 
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Table 4. Analytical grid Denmark 
  Unemployment 
benefits 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment 
benefits 
Unemployment-
related SA 
benefits  
Activation of 
individuals with 
SA benefits  
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
No 
decentralisation 
Low 
decentralisation 
 
Central regulation 
of types of policies 
and minimum 
requirements 
 
The central level 
also formulates 
broad policy 
goals. 
 
The local level 
translates these 
goals into targets. 
Low 
decentralisation 
 
The central level 
regulates SA, 
and the 
municipal level 
formulates 
policy goals. 
 
Low 
decentralisation 
 
Central regulation 
of types of 
policies and 
minimum 
requirements 
 
The central level 
also formulates 
broad policy 
goals. 
 
The local level 
translates these 
goals into targets. 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
No 
decentralisation 
 
UI is 
implemented 
according to the 
Ghent system:  
private (social 
partners) parties 
create UI funds 
which disburse 
benefits, but 
they have no 
policy 
autonomy 
concerning UI. 
Medium 
decentralisation 
 
Municipalities are 
completely 
responsible 
through one-stop 
shops, with some 
responsibilities for 
UI funds. 
The degree of 
decentralisation is 
limited by 
exacting central 
legislation, 
minimum 
requirements and 
monitoring. 
High 
decentralisation 
 
Municipalities 
are completely 
responsible 
through 
municipal 
department. 
Medium 
decentralisation 
 
Municipalities are 
completely 
responsible 
through one-stop 
shops. 
The degree of 
decentralisation is 
hampered by 
strict central 
legislation, 
minimum 
requirements and 
monitoring. 
3 Budgetary responsibility Shared between 
the central and 
the municipal 
level 
 
The UI funds 
fund their own 
administration 
through 
contributions of 
members. 
Shared between 
the central and the 
municipal level 
 
The municipalities 
fund activation 
and the central 
level partially 
reimburses them. 
 
The UI funds fund 
their own 
administration 
through 
contributions of 
members. 
Shared between 
the central and 
the municipal 
level 
 
The 
municipalities 
fund SA and the 
central level 
partially 
reimburses 
them. 
Shared between 
the central and the 
municipal level 
 
The municipalities 
fund activation 
and the central 
level partially 
reimburses them. 
INSTITUTIONAL MORAL HAZARD IN THE MULTI-TIERED REGULATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS | 67 
 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
Yes 
 
From the 
municipal to the 
central level 
Yes 
 
From the central 
to the municipal 
level 
Yes  
 
From the central 
to the municipal 
level 
 Yes 
 
From the central 
to the municipal 
level 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
n.a. Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
Output Input, output and 
outcome 
 
Very elaborate 
monitoring system 
which focuses on 
inputs and 
outputs. 
Ministerial goals 
are mostly 
outcome-based. 
Output Input, output and 
outcome 
 
Very elaborate 
monitoring 
system which 
focuses on inputs 
and outputs 
 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
n.a. 
 
The legislation 
concerning UI 
and the 
implementation 
thereof is tightly 
regulated at the 
central level. 
Yes 
 
Relatively strict set 
of minimum 
requirements, 
including 
minimum amount 
of meetings and 
mandatory work 
processes 
No 
 
The legislation 
concerning UI 
and the 
implementation 
thereof is tightly 
regulated at the 
central level. 
Yes 
 
Relatively strict 
set of minimum 
requirements, 
including 
minimum amount 
of meetings and 
mandatory work 
processes 
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
n.a. 
 
There is no 
lower level of 
government 
involved in the 
implementation. 
The funds 
receive no 
performance-
based rewards 
or sanctions. 
The 
reimbursement 
model entails 
financial 
incentives for the 
municipalities.  
 
Municipal costs 
are contingent on 
activation 
(measured in 
output indicators). 
The 
reimbursement 
model entails 
financial 
incentives for 
the 
municipalities.  
 
Municipal costs 
are contingent 
on activation 
(measured in 
output 
indicators). 
The 
reimbursement 
model entails 
financial 
incentives for the 
municipalities. 
 
Municipal costs 
are contingent on 
activation 
(measured in 
output indicators). 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
Institutional moral hazard exists, there 
is much awareness and the responses 
have been numerous. 
 
Municipalities are subject to very 
detailed monitoring. This monitoring 
system is tied to a reimbursement and 
contribution model. The mandatory 
Institutional moral hazard exists, there 
is much awareness and the responses 
have been numerous. 
 
 
Municipalities are subject to a very 
detailed monitoring system, which is 
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municipal contributions to central UI 
funding and the central 
reimbursement of municipal 
activation efforts are contingent on the 
compliance and efforts of the 
municipalities. A strict system of 
minimum requirements is applied. 
Reform is underway to simplify the 
financial system and to address the 
strictness of minimum requirements. 
There has been much concern for the 
role of UI funds in the past. But 
besides the measures described above, 
the UI funds have been intrinsically 
loyal to government policies to ensure 
their existence. 
tied to a reimbursement model. The 
central reimbursement of municipal 
activation efforts and SA costs are 
contingent on the compliance and 
efforts of the municipalities.  
There was also a strict system of 
minimum requirements applied. 
Reform is underway to simplify the 
financial system and address the 
strictness of minimum requirements. 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
There are no obvious principal-agent 
problems concerning the 
implementation of the passive part of 
UI by private funds. The central 
government has tightly regulated 
these funds. 
 
Principal-agent concept is not 
applicable to the active part of UI (due 
to the political nature of 
decentralisation) 
n.a. (due to the political nature of 
decentralisation, we do not apply the 
principal-agent concept here). 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
Very important (Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
The three most important actors in the Danish regulation of unemployment system are the central level, 
the Unemployment Insurance funds and the municipalities. Currently, the division of labour between 
the central and municipal levels generates institutional moral hazard. There is much concern for 
institutional moral hazard, which has been translated into a very detailed performance management 
system that is coupled to a reimbursement system. Both the detailed monitoring and the reimbursement 
system are hallmarks of the Danish model.28 The trade-off between the complexity of central controls 
and the need for local flexibility is a source of ongoing reform efforts. 
                                                   
28 Our conclusion may seem to contradict two OECD LEED studies (Giguère & Froy, 2009; Froy, 
Giguère, Pyne, & Wood, 2011). Especially the study by Giguère & Froy (2009) finds that Danish 
subnational employment offices have a high degree of implementation flexibility. Our analysis differs 
from these studies in two respects: (i) we have a different focus, (ii) since the period studied by the 
OECD LEED team, additional reforms have been introduced. Our emphasis is on the relationship 
between levels of government, while the OECD LEED studies place more emphasis on the relationship 
between job centres vis-à-vis governments; they do not factor in “the degree of separation between 
functions between different governance levels” (Giguère & Froy, 2009, p. 51). Moreover, they note that 
in their conceptualisation of flexibility “it does not matter whether central or sub-state governments are 
in charge of employment policy, but [it matters] that flexibility is available to actors at various levels of 
the system to allow for the adaptation of the orientation of programmes to contemporary economic 
challenges” (Froy, Giguère, Pyne, & Wood, 2011, pp. 11-12). Although the OECD LEED studies and our 
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The central level regulates SA benefits, while the municipal level implements SA benefits; the 
central level regulates and implements UI benefits. Currently, the municipal level is 
responsible for the activation of both caseloads (UI and SA). Previously, the central level 
activated UI clients, but this led to discrepancies between UI activation and SA activation, 
much like in the Austrian, German and Swiss cases. The subsequent decentralisation of UI 
activation and the harmonisation of SA and UI activation within a single one-stop shop led 
(counter-intuitively) to more central control over municipal behaviour. But municipalities and 
municipal workers did not always accept federal goals as legitimate, and so-called ‘compliance 
gaps’ emerged. 
The Danish reimbursement model, which generates financial incentives for local compliance, 
is meant to realign local and central interests. Simply put, the municipal level bears the 
financial burden for SA benefits and for the activation of both SA and UI. If municipalities 
comply with the central regulation on activation (which involves the broad design of policies, 
a system of minimum requirements and mandatory reporting), they are reimbursed for a part 
of their spending on activation and SA benefits. The level of reimbursement depends upon the 
specific efforts of the municipalities. UI benefits are financed by the central level, but require 
mandatory municipal contributions, which are also contingent upon compliance with 
regulation and activation efforts. Some of these central conditions comprise a system of 
minimum requirements, which encroaches upon municipal flexibility. This system is based on 
a detailed mandatory monitoring system, enforced by the regional level. 
Without the minimum requirements and monitoring, the municipalities would have the 
incentive to ‘park’ clients – by placing them in programmes without meaningful impact – in 
order to collect the reimbursement and lower their contributions to UI costs. However, 
currently, institutional moral hazard still stems from municipalities relabelling old policies to 
fit the central system of minimum requirements (on which reimbursement is based) without 
actually changing the substance of those policies. Furthermore, municipalities now have the 
incentive to utilise those policies which attract the highest reimbursement, even if those 
policies would not be appropriate. 
The monitoring system and the system of minimum requirements can be seen as attempts of 
the central level to exert influence over the municipalities in order to harmonise activation 
policies for UI and SA and to enforce central goals. Non-compliance has been among the most 
important motivations for several reforms. It could, therefore, be said that institutional moral 
hazard is indeed perceived as an important issue in Denmark. However, the complicated 
system of reporting and financing created by these reforms still generates some forms of 
                                                   
survey overlap to some extent (in terms of research questions), there are differences. For example, our 
study emphasises political authority over implementation of activation. As a result, whether lower 
levels of government or job centres can outsource their responsibilities or collaborate with other entities 
is a less prominent question than in the OECD LEED studies, in which outsourcing and collaboration 
are the biggest contributing factors to the assessment of flexibility (Giguère & Froy, 2009, p. 49). 
Additionally, since those OECD studies came out, there have been quite influential reforms. Some of 
these reforms have taken place in the period between the two studies and are subsequently reflected in 
the 2011 study; such as the detailed monitoring and reporting system (Froy, Giguère, Pyne, & Wood, 
2011, pp. 42, 84). But other reforms, such as the implementation of the reimbursement model that was 
coupled to the system of minimum requirements, have not yet been included in either study. It is our 
contention that the reforms since 2010-11 have been the high watermark of central control, which is why 
we describe Danish implementation flexibility as ‘medium’. Currently, reforms are underway that will 
give, once again, more implementation flexibility to the Danish municipalities. 
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institutional moral hazard. Furthermore, the complicated nature of reporting and financing 
makes the system as a whole cumbersome and difficult to oversee. This combination of factors 
has led to yet another round of reforms which are still underway. The system of 
reimbursement will probably be simplified and be applied to all benefits in a uniform way. 
Additionally, the reimbursements will become contingent on outcomes rather than outputs. 
Currently, the performance management system is mostly concerned with what municipalities 
do (output), rather than outcomes. By severing the link with output, municipalities will enjoy 
more flexibility and at the same time not be able to manipulate the system through relabelling. 
It is still unclear, however, how these new reforms will be implemented and what their result 
will be. 
Finally, there has been a lot of concern for the role of the UI funds. Besides the administration 
and disbursements of UI benefits, these funds are also involved in the activation of UI 
beneficiaries, most notably they assess work-readiness. Because their clients are voluntary 
due-paying members, the UI funds have been perceived as being too soft. However, research 
has shown that these concerns are somewhat misplaced. Rather, the UI fund managers seem 
to be aware that their funds’ role is precarious and that any misconduct might endanger their 
role in the entire system. Nonetheless, such concerns over the UI funds are an additional 
indication that concern for institutional moral hazard is very prominent in the Danish 
regulation of unemployment. 
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Country fiche Germany 
 
List of Abbreviations 
BA – Bundesagentur für Arbeit (the federal PES) 
ALG I – Arbeitslosenversicherung (unemployment insurance) 
ALG II – Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende but often referred to as Arbeitslosengeld II (SA) 
SA – Social Assistance 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
Table 5. Analytical grid Germany 
  Unemployment 
benefits (ALG I) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment 
benefits 
Unemployment-
related SA/ 
income support 
benefits (ALG II) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
SA benefits  
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
No 
decentralisation 
 
Low 
decentralisation 
 
Federal level 
prescribes the 
design of policies 
and sets broad 
goals. The BA 
formulates its own 
internal targets. 
No 
decentralisation 
 
Low 
decentralisation 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
No 
decentralisation 
 
(The BA 
implements and 
administers the 
disbursement of 
benefits but has 
no policy 
autonomy 
concerning UI; 
hence, no 
delegation.) 
Delegation to BA 
and high 
decentralisation  
 
The BA 
implements 
activation with 
significant leeway. 
No 
decentralisation 
 
Delegation to BA 
and medium 
decentralisation  
 
Within joint 
consortia 
(operated by the 
municipalities and 
the BA), the BA is 
responsible for 
activation. The 
leeway of the BA 
is more limited 
(compared to 
ALG I) due to 
federal 
monitoring and 
some mandatory 
work processes. 
 
Within the 
Optionskommunen, 
the activation is 
implemented by 
the municipalities 
themselves within 
the same limits as 
the BA. 
3 Budgetary responsibility Federal 
 
Financed by 
social 
contributions 
Federal 
 
Financed by social 
contributions 
Federal and 
municipalities 
 
The federal level 
finances the 
major part of the 
Federal 
 
Financed by 
taxation 
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benefits 
(financed by 
taxation) while 
the 
municipalities 
contribute to 
housing and 
heating 
supplements. 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Except for 
Optionskommunen, 
which receive 
federal funds to 
implement 
activation.  
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per 
capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
Yes 
 
Structural 
differences in 
caseloads 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
n.a. Delegation, with 
managerial 
decentralisation to 
the BA 
 
The BA is an agent 
of the federal 
government. 
n.a. 
 
 
Delegation, with 
managerial 
decentralisation to 
the BA 
 
In 
Optionskommunen: 
political 
decentralisation 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
n.a.  Qualitative (but 
not quantitative) 
outcome 
indicators 
n.a. Outcome 
indicators 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
n.a. 
 
The legislation 
concerning ALG 
I and the 
implementation 
thereof is tightly 
regulated at the 
federal level. 
No n.a.  Yes, but very 
limited 
 
Mandatory 
integration 
agreement 
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
n.a. No 
 
No financial 
incentives from 
the federal level to 
the BA. Within the 
BA, there are 
small financial 
bonuses for 
managers at the 
local level. 
n.a. No 
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10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
n.a. 
 
There is only a single level of 
government involved in the 
governance of ALG I. 
Institutional moral hazard only exists 
in the Optionskommunen. This has been 
addressed through supervision by the 
regional authorities and quantified 
target agreements. 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
Principal-agent issues exist w.r.t. 
activation of ALG I caseload and this 
has been addressed through a system 
of performance measurement, NPM 
reforms. The BA is overseen by a 
tripartite supervisory board. 
Principal-agent issues exist w.r.t. ALG 
II, specifically concerning the BA and 
the job centres. This has been 
addressed through a system of 
performance measurement, 
monitoring by the Länder and 
quantified target agreements. 
Furthermore, the BA is overseen by a 
tripartite supervisory board. 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
Important (Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a) 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
The German system is one of the most centralised cases within our selection. The extent of centralisation 
is the result of reforms aimed at preventing institutional moral hazard. Responsibilities are divided 
between the federal government, the federal PES (the Bundesagentur für Arbeit or BA) and the local 
level – with a supervisory role for the regional level. The German system is characterised by a difficult 
relationship between its actors and by a unique feature: a number of municipalities which have opted 
out of the default model of joint governance (together with the BA) for the activation of SA beneficiaries. 
Many of the German reforms have revolved around reigning in both institutional moral hazard and 
principal-agent issues. The most important reforms (the Hartz reforms) have served multiple purposes: 
to reign in municipal control over SA, harmonise the activation of UI and SA, and tackle principal-
agent issues concerning the federal PES. 
The federal level legislates and funds both UI (ALG I) and SA (ALG II). The BA is the most 
important actor concerning activation. Before the Hartz reforms of 2002-05, two residual 
unemployment assistance schemes existed: unemployment assistance and SA. The federal 
level was predominantly responsible for unemployment assistance and the municipalities 
were the most important actor for the old SA scheme. Activation of both UI and assistance was 
implemented by the BA and activation of the old SA was in the hands of the municipalities. 
Due to large disparities between the SA burdens of the municipalities, some municipalities 
were less capable of delivering meaningful activation services. This created a twofold 
disparity: between the respective efforts of different municipalities on one hand, and between 
the activation regimes implemented by the BA and the municipalities on the other hand (much 
like in the Austrian, Swiss and, to some extent, the Danish systems). The Hartz reforms 
combined unemployment assistance and the old SA into a single unemployment-related SA 
scheme: ALG II. The federal level centralised regulation concerning ALG II and also took on a 
larger budgetary responsibility over this benefit. Activation of ALG II was to be implemented 
by joint consortia (one-stop shops for SA beneficiaries), which were operated simultaneously 
by the municipalities and the BA. Within those consortia, the BA became the responsible actor 
for activation, but for the beneficiaries they would act as a single entity. Therefore, currently, 
the BA is responsible for activation of the ALG I and the ALG II caseloads. This eliminated the 
possibility for institutional moral hazard with regard to benefits and activation. 
These joint consortia were not unopposed. Within the consortia themselves, there was a clash 
of cultures between the municipal employees and the BA employees, and the municipalities 
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saw the consortia as infringing upon their autonomy. Subsequently, the constellation was 
reorganised, the consortia gained an independent status and the regional authorities (the 
Länder) were given the task of monitoring their overall performance. The BA remains 
responsible for the supervision of activation efforts. Some municipalities (Optionskommunen) 
have opted out of this system of joint governance over ALG II activation and have assumed 
the activation responsibilities themselves. This entails that, contrary to the other 
municipalities, the decentralisation to these municipalities can be classified as ‘political 
decentralisation’. It required a constitutional change in order to reorganise the joint consortia 
and to create and maintain the Optionskommunen, because the previous constellation 
included unconstitutional ‘mixed administration’ systems. The federal government continues 
to fund both the activation and a large part of the benefits for the ‘opting’ municipalities. As a 
consequence, this constellation creates the potential for institutional moral hazard. This has 
been addressed by closer supervision by the Länder, who take over the oversight 
responsibilities from the BA concerning activation. However, this regional oversight has not 
prevented these Optionskommunen from performing differently (worse in the eyes of the BA). 
This indicates that the institutional moral hazard continues to exist in the Optionskommunen. 
The caseloads of ALG I and ALG II are not subject to the same activation regime. Moreover, 
the BA has a slightly different role in both regimes. Since the Hartz reforms, the BA 
(concerning the ALG I regime) has acted as a semi-independent agency which both 
administrates the passive side and implements activation. In this capacity, the BA acts as an 
at-arm’s-length agency, subject to performance measurement and overseen by a tripartite 
committee. For ALG II, the BA acts as a contracted partner and is consequently subject to 
stronger supervision and direction from the federal level. The Hartz reforms included a reform 
of the BA. Ironically, it was a scandal involving the PES that set off the reforms. The old PES 
was found to be intentionally misrepresenting placement figures. Subsequently, the BA was 
reorganised along New Public Management lines, with a stronger role played by the federal 
government. 
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Country fiche Switzerland 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AC – Fonds de compensation de l’Assurance-Chômage (unemployment insurance fund) 
AVIG/LACI – Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz/Loi sur l'assurance-chômage (Federal Act on Obligatory Unemployment Insurance 
and Insolvency Compensation) 
PES – Public Employment Services 
RAV/ORP – Regionalen Arbeitsvermittlungszentren/Offices Régionaux de Placement (regional employment offices) 
SA – Social Assistance 
SKOS/CSIAS – Schweizerische Konferenz für Sozialhilfe/Conférence Suisse des Institutions d'Action Sociale (Swiss Conference for 
Social Assistance) 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
Table 6. Analytical grid Switzerland 
  Unemployment 
benefits 
(AVIG/LACI) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment 
benefits 
Unemployment-
related social 
assistance/inco
me support 
benefits  
Activation of 
individuals with 
social assistance 
benefits  
1 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. design 
of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
No 
decentralisation 
Medium 
decentralisation 
 
Federal level 
provides broad 
regulation 
concerning regular 
activation policies 
(which are only 
for UI 
beneficiaries) and 
it prescribes a 
system of 
minimum 
requirements. 
Total 
decentralisation 
 
Non-binding 
common 
guidelines by 
inter-cantonal 
cooperation 
conference 
(SKOS/CSIAS) 
 
Total 
decentralisation  
 
Non-binding 
common 
guidelines by 
inter-cantonal 
cooperation 
conference 
(SKOS/CSIAS) 
 
2 Degree of 
decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on 
lower level) w.r.t. 
implementation of the 
policy  
No 
decentralisation  
 
Disbursement 
and 
administration 
is performed by 
UI funds but 
they do not have 
any policy 
autonomy 
concerning UI. 
High 
decentralisation 
 
Implementation is 
done by regional 
(cantonal) job 
centres. Cantons 
formulate their 
own strategy: they 
may only provide 
the regular 
services to UI 
clients but the 
choice in which of 
these services are 
provided to whom 
is up to the 
cantons 
themselves. 
Total 
decentralisation 
 
The cantons are 
completely 
responsible for 
the 
implementation 
of SA, without 
any federal 
intervention 
whatsoever. 
Total 
decentralisation 
 
SA clients can 
receive services 
from regional job 
centres (the same 
as for UI clients) 
and from 
municipal welfare 
offices. 
Municipal welfare 
offices provide 
their own 
services, and at 
the regional job 
centres SA clients 
can receive 
regular services or 
additional 
services designed 
by the cantons. 
3 Budgetary responsibility Federal  
 
The federal 
Federal  
 
Activation is 
Cantons and 
municipalities 
 
Cantons, 
municipalities and 
the federal level. 
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unemployment 
insurance fund 
(AC) is 92% 
financed by 
employer and 
employee 
contributions, 
6% by federal 
level and 2% by 
cantons. 
financed out of the 
AC (cf. cell 3 in the 
column on UI). 
It is a cantonal 
competence to 
legislate SA. 
Cantons can 
direct 
municipalities to 
co-finance SA. 
 
The municipalities 
fund their own 
services. Federal 
funds (AC) are 
used for the 
regular services 
but those must be 
co-financed by the 
cantons as well 
(50%), and 
cantons finance 
100% of the 
additional 
services they 
designed. 
4 Budgetary transfers 
between levels of 
government? 
Yes  
 
From the 
cantons to the 
AC but these 
transfers are 
very limited 
(only 2% of AC 
funding). 
Yes  
 
Funding for 
activation is 
transferred from 
the AC to the 
cantons.  
Cantons 
contribute to the 
AC (however, 
these are marginal 
compared to 
federal funding).  
n.a. with regard 
to the federal-
cantons 
relationship. 
 
In some cantons 
municipalities 
do contribute to 
SA costs. 
Yes 
 
Some of the SA 
caseload receives 
regular services. 
These regular 
services, however, 
must be co-
financed (50%) by 
the cantons. 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measured on a per-
capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Cantonal 
caseloads differ 
structurally. 
Yes  
 
Cantonal 
caseloads differ 
structurally. The 
redistributional 
impact is limited 
by a degressive 
formula which 
entails that 
funding per client 
becomes less 
when the 
unemployment 
rate is high. Above 
10% 
unemployment 
rate the cantons 
receive no 
additional funds 
per client. 
n.a. Yes 
 
But only 
concerning the SA 
caseload that 
receives regular 
services. The 
redistributional 
effect is more 
limited than that 
of UI activation 
because only a 
portion of the SA 
clients receive 
those services, 
which must then 
be co-financed by 
the cantons. 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegati
on? 
n.a. 
 
The UI funds act 
as agents for the 
federal level 
with regard to 
the 
implementation 
of the UI 
scheme, but they 
do not have 
Political Political Political 
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policy 
autonomy. 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-
level performance by 
higher level (on the basis 
of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
n.a. Yes 
 
Based on four 
outcome 
measures. 
n.a. n.a. 
 
The SA clients 
who receive 
services at the job 
centres are not 
counted towards 
the outcome 
indicators used 
for the monitoring 
of activation of UI. 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
n.a. 
 
The legislation 
concerning UI 
and the 
implementation 
thereof is tightly 
regulated at the 
federal level. 
Yes 
 
Federal legislation 
dictates the timing 
of initial 
registration and 
the first interview 
and also 
prescribes the 
frequency of 
follow-up 
interviews and the 
definitions of 
‘suitable work’ 
and ‘work 
availability’. 
No 
 
The only federal 
stipulation 
concerns the 
cantonal duty to 
provide ‘a 
minimum 
subsistence 
level’. 
 
Non-binding 
common 
guidelines by 
inter-cantonal 
cooperation 
conference 
(SKOS/CSIAS) 
 
No 
 
Non-binding 
common 
guidelines by 
inter-cantonal 
cooperation 
conference 
(SKOS/CSIAS) 
9 Are performance based-
sanctions/rewards 
applied by the higher 
level at the lower level? 
n.a. Yes 
 
No financial 
incentive 
structure, only a 
possible in-depth 
review (shadow of 
hierarchy) 
n.a. n.a. 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern 
for, and approach to 
problems of institutional 
moral hazard? 
Yes 
 
Institutional moral hazard is possible: 
cantons have no inherent incentives to 
activate. This has been addressed 
through a system of minimum 
requirements, a system of performance 
measurement and a degressive 
formula that limits federal funding for 
cantons with high unemployment 
rates. 
Yes 
 
Cantons were able to shift SA caseload 
to UI through renewal of eligibility. 
These loopholes have been mostly 
closed. Additionally, cantons can use 
regular ALMPs funded by the federal 
AC for SA clients. This has been 
addressed by (an increase in) cantonal 
co-financing of those regular ALMPs 
for SA clients. 
11 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-
agent issues? 
(n.a. to the role of UI funds w.r.t. UI 
benefits. The central government has 
tightly regulated these funds w.r.t. the 
administration of UI benefits.) 
 
n.a. (due to the political nature of 
decentralisation we do not apply p-a 
concept here). 
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P-a is not applicable to UI activation 
(decentralisation has a political 
character). 
12 Contribution to 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the 
benefit system 
The Swiss case is not available in Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a. 
Source: Own compilation. 
The two most important actors in Swiss regulation of unemployment are the federal government and 
the cantons and includes a complicated division of labour. The Swiss case is interesting due to the large 
role of the cantons and the strong concern for institutional moral hazard. With regard to UI, the Swiss 
division of labour resembles the Belgian division of labour; however, compared to Belgium, Swiss UI 
benefits are much less generous in the case of longer-term unemployment and SA plays a much more 
important role. Rising unemployment rates, in combination with the division of labour between the 
cantons and the federal government, have caused concern for institutional moral hazard. Many of the 
Swiss reforms were aimed at reducing these risks, notably with regard to the interplay between UI and 
SA. However, perception and concern for institutional moral hazard have been mitigated by the 
importance attached to the autonomy of the cantons. Reforms have closed off any possibility for dumping 
of SA clients into UI, which, today, seems to limit the salience of institutional moral hazard. But 
mismatches between UI and SA have not been addressed due to the persistent claims to this autonomy 
by the cantons. 
The federal government is responsible for the legislation of UI and controls the UI Fund (AC). 
The AC, which is mostly funded by social contributions, finances UI benefits and UI activation. 
The UI benefit system is implemented by 38 unemployment funds.29 These funds are tightly 
regulated by federal legislation, but they have some flexibility concerning their own 
organisation. UI activation is implemented by 100 regional job centres (RAV/ORP) which are 
controlled by the cantons. The cantons are also responsible for legislating, implementing and 
funding SA benefits and SA activation. They can delegate responsibilities to the municipalities 
concerning the funding and the implementation of activation. 
Very high employment rates limited the use (and therefore the relevance) of SA until the 1990s. 
As unemployment rates rose in the 1990s, more and more unemployed workers exhausted 
their UI claims, and consequently, the SA caseload increased in size. The impact of these rising 
caseloads was heterogeneous, creating disparities between the cantons that were exacerbated 
by cantonal differences in the design of SA schemes. Since, at that point, UI activation was a 
federal responsibility and SA activation a responsibility of the cantons (cf. infra), the rising SA 
caseloads also revealed a structural mismatch between the uniform approach to UI activation 
and the very heterogeneous approach to SA activation. Contrary to the German case, the 
federal government did not step in, but an inter-cantonal conference (SKOS/CSIAS) devised 
non-binding common guidelines that somewhat harmonised the design of SA. Furthermore, 
inter-institutional cooperation (between institutions responsible for different types of benefits) 
was attempted to overcome differences between the different unemployment-related (but also 
disability-related) benefits. However, this type of coordination was not particularly successful. 
Rising unemployment rates also underscored the salience of individual and institutional moral 
hazard. Not only were the rising unemployment rates a matter of concern, but the steep rise 
                                                   
29 Each canton has its own fund and the other 12 are privately organised and set up by social partners. 
They predate federal legislation concerning an obligatory UI scheme (AVIG/LACI). 
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in invalidity insurance indicated that this scheme was being misused to offload UI and SA 
beneficiaries into invalidity pensions. In this period, UI activation was in the hands of local 
PES offices, which were judged on the speed with which they reintegrated their caseload. As 
a consequence, they had incentives to shift their hard-to-place clients to cantonal SA schemes. 
In turn, the cantons had incentives to shift their SA caseload back into UI (through 
programmes that renewed UI eligibility) or to shift their caseload to federally financed 
(invalidity) pension schemes. In response, the federal government reformed the UI legislation 
(AVIG/LACI) to close off most possibilities for benefit renewal through cantonal programmes. 
Furthermore, the federal government created a network of 100 job centres which were to be 
operated by the cantons and made more funds available for activation. The federal 
government also legislated types of regular ALMPs which can be proposed to the UI caseload, 
a system of minimum requirements for the regional job centres and a performance 
measurement system.30 Within these boundaries, the cantons are free to formulate their own 
activation strategy – meaning they can decide which beneficiaries receive each of the 
prescribed services. In practice, the strategies differ greatly. 
The regional job centres are allowed to provide services to SA clients. However, these clients 
are not counted towards the performance measurement system, which ensures that the job 
centres have incentives to focus on the UI caseload. If the job centres provide the regular 
services to the SA clients, the cantons are obliged to co-finance these measures. The rates for 
co-financing of these measures has been increased, reflecting a direct concern for institutional 
moral hazard. Job centres may also provide services that are designed and fully financed by 
the cantons. In practice, however, SA clients most often receive services from municipal 
welfare offices. Especially in the larger municipalities, these welfare offices include dedicated 
activation offices. It is up to the cantons to regulate the additional non-regular services 
provided by the job centres and the other measures. It also falls within their competence to 
regulate the cooperation with municipalities. The harmonising factor, also for activation, is the 
SKOS/CSIAS common guidelines. However, these guidelines are broad and do not cover 
every aspect of the regulation of unemployment. This and the limited effects of inter-
institutional cooperation mean that the mismatch between the UI and SA systems continues 
to this day.  
Despite the system of minimum requirements and the performance monitoring, there were 
still no financial incentives for cantons to activate the UI caseload as effectively and efficiently 
as possible. The federal response has been to implement a degressive formula for the funding 
of ALMPs: funding is based on the rate of UI beneficiaries, but the higher that rate is, the lower 
the funding per beneficiary. Cantons receive no additional funds for the activation of UI 
beneficiaries when the registered jobseeker rate reaches a certain point – essentially, this serves 
as a cap on transfers from the AC to individual cantons. Thus, concern for institutional moral 
hazard has played a very important role in the Swiss case, but that role has been limited by 
the political equilibrium concerning the autonomy of the cantons. 
                                                   
30 We refer to policies which are federally designed specifically for the UI caseload as ‘regular’ ALMPs. 
The UI caseload may only receive these benefits, although they can also be used for other caseloads. 
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Country fiche United States 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AFDC – Aid to Families with Dependent Children  
EB – Extended Benefits 
EmB – Emergency Benefits 
FUTA – Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
MoE – Maintenance of Effort spending 
TANF – Temporary Assistance to Needy Families programme 
SA – Social Assistance 
SNAP – Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
UI – Unemployment Insurance 
WIOA – Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act 
WIA – Workforce Investment Act 
Table 7. Analytical grid United States 
  Unemployment 
benefits 
(Unemployment 
Compensation) 
Activation of 
individuals with 
unemployment benefits 
(WIOA) 
Unemployment-
related SA: TANF  
Activation of 
individuals with TANF 
benefits (WIOA) 
Unemployment related 
SA: SNAP 
Activation of 
individuals with SNAP 
benefits (SNAP E&T) 
1 Degree of decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on lower 
level) w.r.t. design of the policy: 
- Formal regulation 
- Policy goals 
High decentralisation 
 
States are primarily 
responsible for 
unemployment 
compensation, but in 
order to benefit from 
federal financial 
support (indirectly, 
via FUTA, and 
directly, in the case of 
EB and EmB) state 
regulation and policy 
setting must comply 
with federal 
conditions. 
High decentralisation 
 
Federal funding is 
linked to conditions 
w.r.t. state regulation 
and policy setting.  
Policy goals are 
federally defined but 
negotiated and 
supplemented by state 
level. 
High decentralisation 
 
Federal level poses 
conditions for state 
regulation and policy 
setting in order to 
receive federal 
funding. 
High decentralisation 
 
Federal level poses 
conditions for state 
regulation and policy 
setting in order to 
receive federal funding.  
 
Policy goals are 
federally defined but 
negotiated and 
supplemented by state 
level. 
High centralisation 
 
The federal level 
designs the system but 
it leaves some options 
to the states to influence 
some parameters such 
as eligibility. 
High decentralisation 
 
The federal prescribes a 
policy menu and 
outlines the policy 
goals. The states design 
their own programmes 
according to these 
federal guidelines, 
which are also subject 
to federal approval. 
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2 Degree of decentralisation (i.e. 
extent of flexibility on lower 
level) w.r.t. implementation of 
the policy  
High 
Decentralisation 
Total decentralisation Total 
decentralisation 
Total decentralisation Medium 
decentralisation 
 
The federal level and 
the states jointly 
administrate the 
system. States have 
some options to adjust 
administration. 
Total decentralisation 
 
 
3 Budgetary responsibility States and the federal 
level 
 
States: regular 
benefits and half of 
the extended benefits 
(but, in the recent 
recession, temporary 
full federal funding) 
 
Federal: compensates 
the employers for 
state taxes by FUTA, 
but FUTA Credit 
Reduction System 
aims to ensure state 
fiscal responsibility. 
 
Federal: state and 
federal 
administration costs, 
half of extended 
benefit costs, fully 
responsible for 
emergency benefits. 
 
Federal: temporary 
Federal level 
 
WIOA spending is fully 
federal. 
States and the federal 
level 
 
States: MoE spending 
 
Federal: block grants 
to states 
 
Currently the 
division of costs is 
around 40% of state 
spending and 60% of 
federal spending. 
Federal level 
 
WIOA spending is fully 
federal. 
Federal level 
 
Benefits are fully 
federally financed. 
Only administration 
costs are equally shared 
due to federal 
reimbursement of 50% 
of the state’s 
administration costs. 
States and federal level 
 
A small dotation is 
completely federally 
funded, the majority of 
funds are provided by 
the states and 
reimbursed for 50% by 
the federal government. 
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support for regular 
UI, via a loan system 
4 Budgetary transfers between 
levels of governments? 
Yes  
 
On a permanent basis  
concerning 
administration 
purposes 
 
On a temporary basis 
via the ‘loan system’ 
for regular UI (see 
text for a further 
comment) 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Marginal 
 
Only 50% of the state’s 
administration costs are 
reimbursed, otherwise, 
there are no transfers. 
Yes 
5 Structural redistribution? 
(measures on a per capita basis) 
Yes 
 
Structural differences 
in caseloads 
(however, 
redistribution mainly 
occurs in times of EB 
and EmB) 
Yes 
 
Funding is calculated on 
the basis of state shares 
in total unemployed. 
Unemployment 
caseloads show 
structural differences 
between the states. 
Yes 
 
The distribution of 
funds is partially 
calculated on the 
basis of historical 
(AFDC) spending 
patterns. 
Supplemental grants 
are implemented to 
mitigate the fiscal 
impact of 
disproportional 
negatively affected 
states. Funding on a 
per capita basis still 
differs structurally 
between states. 
Yes 
 
Funding is calculated 
on the basis of state 
shares in total 
unemployed. 
Unemployment 
caseloads show 
structural differences 
between the states. 
** ** 
6 Political or managerial 
decentralisation/delegation? 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
Political 
decentralisation 
7 Indicators used in the 
monitoring of lower-level 
performance by higher level (on 
??  Outcome (in WIOA 
plans) 
Mostly input, also 
some output 
Outcome (in WIOA 
plans) 
Output (quality control 
measures) 
Output and outcome 
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the basis of: input, output and 
outcome)? 
8 Is a system of ‘minimum 
requirements’ applied? 
Yes 
 
The federal level 
imposes an 
administrative 
framework.  
 
Yes 
 
The federal level 
imposes a broad 
administrative 
governance model, but 
does not prescribe a 
system of minimum 
requirements 
concerning 
interventions. 
Mandatory activation 
requirements must be 
applied by states for 
persons receiving EB 
and EmB. 
Yes 
 
The federal level 
imposes a broad 
administrative 
governance model. 
This includes 
mandatory reporting, 
setting up of 
additional 
programmes and 
some benefit 
eligibility criteria. 
Requirements for the 
use of federal TANF 
funds are stricter than 
for MoE. 
 
Yes 
 
The federal level 
imposes a broad 
administrative 
governance model. 
States must apply 
mandatory activation 
requirements for TANF 
recipients.  
Yes 
 
States have to comply 
with federal 
regulations. The states 
are provided with some 
options to deviate from 
this slightly. 
Additionally, states are 
obliged to conduct 
quality control reviews 
according to a detailed 
federal system. 
Yes 
 
States have to design 
their programmes 
according to federal 
guidelines, assess 
eligibility of 
participants according 
to federal legislation 
and comply with 
federal reporting 
requirements. 
9 Are performance-based 
sanctions/rewards applied by 
the higher level at the lower 
level ? 
Yes 
 
Non-compliance with 
federal framework or 
a continued deficit 
can result in financial 
sanctions (non-
payment or increased 
federal tax rates) 
Yes 
 
Financial sanctions (and 
incentives for localities) 
for state and local 
performance (in WIOA 
plans) and 
financial sanctions for 
non-compliance with 
framework 
Yes 
 
Based on work 
participation 
requirements: 
direct cuts in grants; 
also indirect: through 
increased levels of 
mandatory state 
spending 
Yes 
 
Financial sanctions 
(and incentives for 
localities)  for state and 
local performance (in 
WIOA plans) and 
financial sanctions for 
non-compliance with 
framework 
Yes 
 
Bonuses are awarded 
for lowest and most 
improved error rates; 
penalties are awarded 
to highest error rates. 
No 
10 Conclusion from 5-6-7: 
perception of, concern about, 
and approach to problems of 
institutional moral hazard? 
Yes 
 
Concern for institutional moral hazard is apparent in UI, SA and activation. In UI institutional moral hazard relates to the possibility of states to borrow 
funds and to the extension of benefits. This has been addressed through automatic repayment of state deficits, federal legislation which enforces the use of 
extended benefits and through additional requirements for activation during extension of benefits. A new form of institutional moral hazard might be the 
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slashing of the duration of regular UI benefits. 
In SA, concern for institutional moral hazard is clearly present in the transition of open-ended funding systems to a conditional block grant model. 
Furthermore, in SNAP the potential for moral hazard exists concerning states’ flexibility in determining eligibility and concerning the quality of payments 
made by states with federal funds. The former seems to be adequately addressed by federal regulations while the latter is addressed by a bonus/malus 
system. That system seems vulnerable to gaming. 
Finally, there has been a long tradition of reforms in multi-tiered education and training policies to prevent moral hazard. Currently, the WIOA includes a 
performance management system based on federal indicators of which the levels are determined partially on the basis of statistical analysis. 
 
11 Conclusions from 5-6-7: 
approach to principal-agent 
problems 
n.a. 
12 Contribution to macroeconomic 
stabilisation by the benefit 
system  
Low (Dolls, Fuest & Peichl, 2012a)  
**The redistribution effects of SNAP have, due to time constraints, not been calculated. 
Source: Own compilation. 
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The two most important actors in American unemployment regulation are the federal administration 
and the states. The US system is characterised by a strong role for the states in both UI and SA and a 
general (transversal) approach to ‘workforce development’. At first sight, concern for institutional moral 
hazard seems limited in the US case, despite some important elements of interstate solidarity at the 
federal level. This apparently limited concern may be explained by the low generosity of UI benefits, a 
large state role in UI funding, federal mechanisms to promote state fiscal responsibility, and major 
reforms of SA in the 1990s to promote SA activation. Simultaneously, American citizens may be more 
ready to organise solidarity at the federal American level than EU citizens are at the EU level. However, 
such an assessment underrates the salience of moral hazard, both at the individual and the institutional 
level, in the American policy debate. However, it would be a mistake to overlook the role of institutional 
moral hazard in the US case, because it has played a role in shaping welfare benefits and, more recently 
and prominently, in UI. 
UI is based on federal-state cooperation. The states are responsible for designing the most 
important parameters and fund the UI state benefits. The federal level imposes minimum 
administrative requirements and funds the administration costs for the states. In times of 
crisis, the federal level also provides Extended Benefits (EB) and Emergency Benefits (EmB). 
The EB are co-financed by the states (but in 2009 their financing became fully federal on a 
temporary basis), and the EmB are fully federally financed. Furthermore, deficits in state UI 
systems can be financed by federal loans. In other words, the UI system incorporates elements 
of interstate solidarity, which take the form of co-insurance and reinsurance by the federal 
level and federal support for administration costs. These mechanisms are more complex than 
in the other cases we examine. Next to imposing minimum administrative requirements, the 
federal level enforces state fiscal responsibility via the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
(FUTA). The US UI benefits are not generous, which may reduce concern for individual and 
institutional moral hazard with regard to UI. Also, the US system of ‘experience rating’ 
includes a specific mechanism to fight moral hazard with the employers. 
One aspect of the US system needs a specific comment. In row 4 of the analytical grid we write 
that ‘transfers between levels of governments’ only apply in the loan system, and with regard 
to the support of the state administrations. In other words, we have chosen to describe the 
American system of EB and EmB as a system that is not characterised by transfers between 
levels of governments. However, from a technical point of view, the EB and EmB are disbursed 
to individual American citizens by the states (who also assess the individual eligibility); state 
accounts are reimbursed by the federal government. Hence, budgetary transfers are applied 
to implement EB and EmB.31 Nevertheless, EB and EmB are seen as truly ‘federal’ benefits in 
the American public debate, clearly distinct from ‘state benefits’. In spirit, they correspond to 
the ‘genuine’ variant of an EUBS, in which a direct link would be established between an EU 
fund and individual European citizens. For that reason, our classification tilts the American 
EB and EmB system towards the ‘genuine’ variant in our overall project. Obviously, this is a 
matter of judgment and debatable (also, given the fact, that the EB and EmB are subject to 
triggers, which is seen as a characteristic feature of equivalent variants of the EUBS in the 
Consortium’s research project; cf. Task 1C).  
One of the SA programmes, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), is operated by 
the states according to very broad federal guidelines. States that comply with these guidelines 
can apply for a federal block grant. However, one of the federal requirements is that the states 
maintain a certain level of spending themselves (Maintenance-of-Effort or MoE spending), so 
                                                   
31 We thank Christopher O’Leary for this information. 
86 | VANDENBROUCKE & LUIGJES 
 
costs for TANF are shared. The other, larger, SA programme (Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program or SNAP, formerly Food Stamps) is a system designed primarily to 
increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households in order to help them 
buy a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. This programme is more centralised than TANF: it 
is designed by the federal government and the states implement it. 
UI and SA activation is part of an overarching approach to ’workforce development’ 
(governed by the federal Workforce Investment Opportunity Act, or WIOA): workforce 
development aims to promote activation and training in all the states but without a link, at the 
level of individuals, with specific benefit schemes. As with TANF and UI, WIOA is 
implemented by the states according to federal guidelines. States can submit claims for WIOA 
funding; once approved, the federal administration finances the state WIOA programmes. 
Since states have an important responsibility with regard to UI activation, the ability of states 
to cover their UI deficits with federal loans and federal financing of UI benefits during times 
of crisis generates institutional moral hazard. Institutional moral hazard in UI has been 
addressed by FUTA, which forces states to cover deficits that persist over two years and 
penalises states for not complying with administrative standards, and by additional activation 
requirements for individuals who receive EB or EmB. In other words, the federal government 
becomes increasingly concerned with institutional moral hazard in UI when federal dollars 
are at stake. Furthermore, since the crisis, states have used their autonomy to decrease the 
length of their UI programmes. During periods of EB, this could lead to extra federal costs, but 
it also endangers the stabilisation effects of the UI programme as a whole. This has been 
signalled by the federal government. 
Furthermore, concern for institutional moral hazard has played an important role in shaping 
the accountability system of the US workforce development system. States enjoy significant 
autonomy in the workforce governance system, but this must be done according to federal 
guidelines. WIOA includes a performance management system, which has been strengthened 
since its last incarnation: the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).  
Institutional moral hazard in SA has been addressed, among other things, by the 
implementation of TANF. Its predecessor (Aid for Families with Dependent Children, or 
AFDC) provided open-ended funding for the states and did not include elaborate activation 
requirements. TANF funds are limited by the size of the block grant and entail activation 
requirements both at the individual and the state level. Additionally, states must report their 
efforts and the way in which they spend their funds. Finally, the MoE requirements address 
the possibility that states replace their own spending with federal funds. The federal 
government is concerned about the quality of the implementation of SNAP by the states and 
uses financial incentives to align state behaviour with federal goals.   
So, although we may presume that concern for institutional moral hazard is less prominent in 
the US than in Europe, due to the low generosity of benefits (and more readiness to organise 
solidarity at the federal American level than at the EU level), it would be wrong to assume that 
concern for institutional moral hazard has not affected the US regulation of unemployment. 
FUTA, the introduction of TANF, the monitoring of WIA efforts and the additional activation 
requirements for individuals with EB or EmB, all bear witness of concern for institutional 
moral hazard. 
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